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I. TTRODUCTION
Processes and Production Methods (PPMs) are the subject of one of the
most knotty controversies in the debate over "trade and environment."' At
t Steve Charnovitz practices law at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering in Washington, D.C. This
Article is based on a lecture delivered at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales in
Geneva in October 2000. Support for this research was provided by the Ford Foundation through the
Global Environment & Trade Study at the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, Yale
University. Thanks to Rob Howse and Gabrielle Marceau for their helpful comments.
1. For background on the trade and environment debate, including the role of PPMs, see
generally AGRICULTURE, TRADE, & THE ENVIRONMENT (Maury E. Bredahl et al. eds., 1996); ASIAN
DRAGONS AND GREEN TRADE (Simon S.C. Tay & Daniel Esty eds., 1996); INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
INVESTMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Ralf Buckley & Clyde Wild eds., 1994); TRADE, ENVIRONMENT,
AND THE MILLENNIUM (Gary P. Sampson & W. Bradnee Chambers eds., 1999); TRADE, ENVIRONMENT
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: VIEWS FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA (Peider
Kdnz et al. eds., 2000); TRADE, GLOBAL POLICY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Per G. Fredriksson ed., 1999,
World Bank, Discussion Paper No. 402); DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT (1994); JAMES R. LEE,
EXPLORING THE GAPS: VITAL LINKS BETWEEN TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND CULTURE (2000); ERNST-
ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN TRADE AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AFTER THE
URUGUAY ROUND (1995); C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED ENVIRONMENT (1994); GARY P.
SAMPSON, TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND TIE WTO: THE POST-SEATTLE AGENDA (2000); PETER
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issue is the appropriateness of imposing trade measures contingent on the
production process.' Commentators often claim that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) prohibits PPM-based restrictions affecting trade.3 Such
claims have convinced many environmentalists that the WTO-led trading
system interferes with ecological protection.
4
The reality of international trade law is different. PPMs affecting trade
are not prohibited per se. Recognizing the correct legal status of PPMs is a
precondition to achieving a much needed reconciliation between the World
Trade Organization and environmentalists.
One of the best known examples of a PPM-based restriction is the U.S.
trade ban on shrimp from countries that have not been certified as having
regulatory regimes in place to prevent the killing of sea turtles in the course of
shrimping.5 The U.S. government imposed a ban on shrimp imports from
countries that federal officials believed were not doing enough to prevent
shrimp trawlers from killing endangered sea turtles. The enforcement of the
U.S. ban led to a high-profile dispute in the World Trade Organization when
UIMONEN & JOHN WHALLEY, ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN THE NEW WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1997);
DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
(1995); RICHARD A. WESTIN, ENVIRONMENTAL TAX INITIATIVES AND MULTILATERAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS: DANGEROUS COLLISIONS (1997); Special Issue: Trade and Environment, 5 ENV'T & DEV.
ECON. 341 (2000); Michael Reiterer, The International Legal Aspects of Process and Production
Methods, 17 WORLD COMPETITION, June 1994, at 111.
2. The earliest analysis of such measures that has come to my attention is Theodor E.
Gregory's tome on tariff methods published in 1921. Gregory explained that trade prohibitions could be
absolute or "contingent." As examples of a contingent prohibition, he pointed to import bans on
commodities produced by a government monopoly, import bans on prison-made goods, import bans on
copyrighted commodities and goods with fraudulent trademarks, and import bans on goods liable to
cause danger to public health. TE. GREGORY, TARIFFS: A STUDY IN METHOD 114-15 (1921).
3. See text accompanying infra notes 83-91 for examples. The WTO is the
intergovernmental organization that supervises national trade policies. The WTO became operative in
1995 as an institutional replacement for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Generally, this Article uses the word "GATT" to refer to the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, which have been in force (with some amendments) since 1948. General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. This agreement
was incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 by way of paragraph 1(a) of
Annex IA of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, April 15, 1994
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENTS INCLUDING THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AS SIGNED
ON APRIL 15, 1994 17 (World Trade Organization, 1999) [hereinafter LEGAL TEXTS]. Generally, this
Article uses the word "GATT" to refer to the pre-WTO trading system. For a short primer on the WTO,
see Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-W'TO System at 50, 16 WISC. INT'L L.J. 421 (1998).
4. See, e.g., HILARY FRENCH, VANISHING BORDERS: PROTECTING THE PLANET IN THE AGE
OF GLOBALIZATION 117-18, 122 (2000). French is vice president for research at the Worldwatch
Institute. See also LORI WALLACH & MICHELLE SFORZA, WHOSE TRADE ORGANIZATION? CORPORATE
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EROSION OF DEMOCRACY 5, 23, 28 (1999) (warning of threats posed by WTO
rulings to the environment).
5. This trade ban is carried out pursuant to section 609 of the Department of Commerce,
Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990. 16 U.S.C. § 1537
(2001). Many people assume that section 609 is part of the Endangered Species Act because the
codifiers placed a historical and statutory note in that part of the U.S. Code. See, e.g., Turtle Island
Restoration Network v. Mallett, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1016 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2000) ("Section 609 is part
of the Endangered Species Act."). This is an incorrect assumption, however, despite the obvious
relationship between the goals of section 609 and the Endangered Species Act. A provision of federal
law cannot become part of the Endangered Species Act unless the Congress amends the Act to put it
there; the Congress has not done that in this case.
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four countries-India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand-brought a case
against the United States.6 This famous WTO dispute is known as the
"Shrimp-Turtle" case.'
Shrimp-Turtle demonstrates the cloud of suspicion surrounding the
application of PPMs. This Article argues that rather than a covert tool of
protectionism, a PPM can be an appropriate instrument of environmental
policy. A number of international instruments already bear witness to this fact.
For example, the World Charter for Nature, approved by the United Nations
General Assembly in 1982, calls on governments to "[e]stablish standards for
products and manufacturing processes that may have adverse effects on
nature, as well as agreed methodologies for assessing these effects."" In fact,
the WTO treaty acknowledges the importance of production methods for
environmental policy. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture-in prescribing
criteria for domestic support measures that remain exempt from reduction-
states that payments under environmental programs must be dependent on
specific conditions such as "conditions related to production methods or
inputs." Of course, neither the World Charter for Nature nor the Agreement
on Agriculture provides an explicit endorsement of a PPM affecting trade. So
long as a government applies PPMs only to domestic producers, no other
government is likely to complain at the WTO. Trade conflicts are likely to
arise, however, upon application of a PPM to imported products or to foreign
service suppliers.
With the goal of promoting the resolution of such potential trade
conflicts, this Article presents a new taxonomy of PPM-based restrictions.
PPMs that focus on the manner of production are preferable to PPMs that
focus on the country of production. Recognizing that form matters can allow
the WTO and the environmental community to communicate, thus enabling
environmentalists to articulate their demands in a manner consistent with the
principles of non-discriminatory trade embodied in the WTO.
Several WTO agreements already recognize the validity of PPMs that
clearly affect trade." The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
6. See Bruce Neuling, The Shrimp-Turtle Case: Implications for Article XYC of GAIT and
the Trade and Environment Debate, 22 LoYOLAL.A_ INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1(1999).
7. Notwithstanding its formal name in the WTO as "United States - Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products," this lawsuit is widely known as the Shrimp-Turtle case. Even the
WTO website uses this shorthand designation: "India etc. versus US: 'Shrimp-Turtle,"' available at
http://www.wto.orglenglishltratopeenvir e/edisO8e.htm. When it originally captioned the case in
1997, the WTO Secretariat missed the opportunity to demonstrate its understanding that a key issue in
the case was the conservation of turtles. The WTO's name for the case reflects an assumption that the
United States had been banning shrimp imports to protect its shrimping industry. In an effort to show the
bias in how the WTO Secretariat styled the case, Robert Howse renames it the "Turtles panel." For his
critique of the VITO panel report, see Robert Howse, The Turtles Panel: Another Environmental
Disaster in Geneva, 32 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1998, at 73.
8. World Charter for Nature, U.N. Doc. A1RES/37/7, Nov. 9, 1982, 21(b), 22 I.L.M. 455,
459 (1983).
9. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, 12(a), LEGAL
TEXs, supra note 3, at 52. Domestic support includes direct payments (or foregone revenue) provided
to agricultural producers.
10. Aaron Cosbey, The WTO and PPMs: Time to Drop a Taboo, BRIDGES BETWEEN TRADE
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Jan.-Apr. 2001, at 11, available at http://www.ictsd.org.
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Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) states that governments shall allow a
reasonable interval between the publication of a regulation and its entry into
force in order to allow time for producers "to adapt their products and
methods of production to the requirements of the importing Member."' The
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) has a similar provision. 12
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) requires governments to establish a procedure enabling the holder of
an intellectual property right to ask customs authorities to detain goods
produced with a counterfeit trademark or "pirated" copyright.'3 In all of these
agreements, however, the foreign production process is of concern only
because of its impact on the importing country.
The quarrel with PPMs is not about this kind of measure; rather, it is
about the use of trade measures with an outwardly directed purpose. The U.S.
import ban on shrimp was outwardly directed in that it sought to save turtles
being killed hundreds or thousands of miles away. Such measures respond to
the fact that activities by the nationals of one country can adversely affect the
global commons.
Of course, PPMs are not always inspired by altruism. A government that
has imposed a regulatory burden on its domestic producers may seek to
impose a similar burden on foreign producers to keep them from gaining a
competitive advantage. PPMs may also be contrived to shield domestic
producers and workers from import competition. For example, a government
might seek to put a special tariff on imports manufactured under lower
environmental standards than a like domestic product.
The use of environmental PPMs is controversial for two main reasons.
First, a PPM can restrict trade or make it harder and costlier for an exporter to
supply a foreign market. Second, PPMs are a signal from importing countries
to exporting countries about the environmental practices and laws that the
importing country thinks the exporting country should have. The transmission
of values through trade is not new and has occurred since antiquity. PPMs are
different, however, because they employ government-set trade restrictions to
transmit values. These two features alone would suffice to make PPMs
contentious; yet the latent controversies are intensified by one further point.
The user of the PPM is almost always a rich country, and the target country is
often a developing country. This factor has led to the charge that
environmental PPMs are a tool of eco-imperialism: the rich country may be
1 I. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 68 [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
"Member" means a state or other entity that has joined the WTO. The SPS Agreement supervises
government measures to protect domestic human, animal, or plant life or health from risks such as pests,
disease, food additives, and toxins. For example, a measure banning the importation of anthrax spores
would be governed by SPS rules.
12. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA,
art. 2.12, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 124 [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. The TBT Agreement
supervises government-set product standards and promotes harmonization.
13. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
WTO Agreement, Annex IC, art. 51, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 344 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement].
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viewed as trying to coerce the poor country into placing a higher value on the
environment than the poor country considers appropriate.
The international debate on PPMs is understandably heated. Both
proponents and opponents of PPMs are convinced that they are right, and no
compromise has emerged in the past several years. This debate is worth
examining because it reflects different assumptions about what the WTO law
is. A central disagreement is whether the rules of the WTO's General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibit PPMs per se, or whether
they are permitted in certain circumstances. The GATT is one of the central
agreements in the WTO treaty system. GATT rules supervise government
restrictions on trade in goods. The GATT also contains exceptions in Article
XX that may be used to justify environmental measures.'
This Article explicates and appraises the WTO law of PPMs. A better
understanding of the law and of how PPMs operate could help governments
and stakeholders improve the management of outwardly directed PPMs. Right
now, governments have divergent views about WTO rules. This has led to an
inside out debate from which a political consensus cannot easily emerge.
The law of PPMs received a useful clarification in October 1998 when
the WTO Appellate Body handed down its decision in the Shrimp-Turtle
case.15 The Appellate Body's decision seemed to imply that PPMs could be
legal under the WTO. Ironically, turtles remained a flash point with the public
thirteen months later when some of the anti-WTO protestors in Seattle dressed
up as turtles to complain about the WTO's ruling. 6 Even today, a pervasive
myth exists that the WTO forbids PPMs. If this were true, it would put the
WTO at odds with environmental policy. As discussed below, however, this
interpretation of WTO law is flawed.
The myth that PPMs are illegal under WTO law has had three harmful
consequences. First, it has fed some of the public protests against the WTO. In
his careful study of trade-related environmental measures in 1995, Howard
Chang warned of this danger:
The creation of barriers to environmental protection in the name of free trade has eroded
respect for GATT institutions in particular and political support for free trade in general..
. The GATT panels were understandably concerned about the potential for protectionist
abuse of Article XX. Their crude but sweeping rules against trade restrictions, however,
make no attempt to distinguish between legitimate environmental concerns and
14. GATT Article XX is discussed extensively below. For the relevant portions of Article
XX, see text accompanying infra note 99.
15. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter
Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report]. The U.S. government made the importation of shrimp
contingent on whether exporting country governments had in place a regulatory program (addressing the
incidental killing of sea turtles) that was comparable to the U.S. regulatory program. The Appellate
Body ruled that the manner in which the law was being applied violated WTO rules because there was
arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination against the complaining governments.
16. Joan Lowy, Protesters Have Long List of Complaints Against World Trade Group,
CHATrANOOGA FREE PRESS, Dec. 2, 1999, at A7.
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protectionism, and in the process do the cause of free trade a great disservice: the political
backlash against free trade may also fail to make the same distinction.
17
Although the GATT jurisprudence on Article XX has improved substantially
since 1995, the public is not yet aware of this development." Thus, the second
negative effect of the myth that PPMs are illegal under WTO law is that the
divergence of views on the legality of PPMs has impeded potential progress in
the ongoing work of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment. Finally,
the third harmful consequence of the myth of illegality is that without a shared
comprehension of the legal baseline, it is impossible to develop new
disciplines to prevent inappropriate PPMs.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II explains what PPMs are and
presents a new PPM taxonomy. It also explains why PPMs are sometimes
needed for environmental management. Part III examines the relevant WTO
case law on the issue of PPMs and finds that PPMs are not prohibited by the
WTO. Part IV ties together Parts II and III to show how a correct legal reading
may enable new integrative solutions that resolve trade and environment
tensions and establish a better framework for preventing inappropriate PPMs. ll
This Article focuses on environmental PPMs. Although the taxonomy
can be applied to all PPMs, the legal and policy conclusions reached here are
not necessarily applicable to other kinds of trade PPMs, such as labor
standards or restrictions based on human rights or animal welfare. This point
is noted at the start to forestall the inevitable complaint that countenancing
environmental PPMs will open the door to less justifiable PPMs. °
II. WHAT ARE PPMS AND WHEN ARE THEY JUSTIFIABLE?
The term "processes and production methods" originated in the GATT
agreement of 1979 on Technical Barriers to Trade and referred to product
standards focused on the production method rather than product
characteristics." For example, a law prohibiting the landing of fish caught
using a drifinet is a PPM.2 By contrast, a law prohibiting the sale of fish
17. Howard F. Chang, An Economic Analysis of Trade Measures to Protect the Global
Environment, 83 GEo. L.J. 2131, 2209 (1995). When he refers to "GATT panels," Chang means the
panels appointed by the GATT as an organization before it was absorbed into the WTO in 1994.
18. See Carrie Wofford, A Greener Future at the WTO: The Refinement of V/TO
Jurisprudence on Environmental Exceptions to GA2, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 563, 589 (2000)
(noting that activists seem unaware of the improvement in WTO jurisprudence); Michael M. Weinstein,
Greens and Globalization: Declaring Defeat in the Face of Victory, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 22, 2001, § 4, at
18 (contrasting developments in WTO jurisprudence with the views of the anti-WTO protestors).
19. HAROLD D. LAsswELL & MYREs S. McDouGAL, 2 JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY
1050-53 (Special Edition, 1997) (discussing integrative solutions).
20. See, e.g., Magda Shahin, Trade and Environment: How Real is the Debate?, in TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM, supra note 1, at 35, 46 (expressing concern that environmental
PPMs could be an opening for the enactment of PPMs aimed at improving labor standards, human
rights, good governance, and all sorts of other social measures that are more properly matters for
domestic political decision and have hardly any relationship with the WTO).
21. TBT Agreement, supra note 12, at 117.
22. See, e.g., Driftnet Prohibition Act § 8, 1991 (N.Z.), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 214, 218, 200
(1992). U.S. law prohibits the importation of tuna from certain countries unless the exporting country
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smaller than a prescribed size is not a PPM. During the 1990s, the PPM
concept expanded beyond product standards to embrace taxes and import
bans.
A. The Related- Unrelated Distinction
Analysts often divide PPMs into two categories-product-related and
non-product-related.4  Product-related PPMs are used to assure the
functionality of the product, or to safeguard the consumer who uses the
product. Food safety may be the best example of how regulators rely on
process-based sanitary rules. 5 They do so to avoid having to test the salubrity
of the individual product because that could destroy its market value. Such
PPMs help assure that consumers receive a product at the anticipated quality
level. Thus, they are related to the product even though adherence to a
particular process may not be directly detectable in the product.
By contrast, the non-product-related PPM is designed to achieve a social
purpose that may or may not matter to a consumer. For example, prohibiting
the use of a driftnet to catch fish may achieve an ecological goal but has no
effect on a fish as such or on its nutritional and gustatory value for the
consumer. Hence, such PPMs are referred to as non-product-related.
Although this related/unrelated distinction is not stated explicitly, it
appears to be used in the TBT and SPS agreements. The TBT Agreement
defines a covered regulation as a document which "lays down product
characteristics or their related processes and production methods . . ." This
would seem to suggest that TBT covers product-related PPMs and does not
address other PPMs.27 SPS defines covered measures broadly and includes
those referring to "processes and production methods."' Yet because SPS
applies only to measures seeking to protect life or health within the territory of
the importing country, the typical non-product-related PPM would be
excluded by this geographic limitation.29 The typical governmental measure
reviewable by the SPS Agreement would be either a testable food safety
government certifies that the tuna was not harvested with a large-scale drifinet. 16 U.S.C. §
1371(a)(2)(F)(ii) (2000).
23. The United States has such a law for lobsters. 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(J) (2000).
24. OECD Secretariat, Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework
and Considerations on Use of PPM-Based Trade Measures, OECD/GD(97)137 (1997).
25. Linda K. Horton, Food from Developing Countries: Steps to Improve Compliance, 53
FOOD& DRuGL.J. 139, 143-46, 158 (1998).
26. TBT Agreement, supra note 12, 1 (emphasis added).
27. See WTO Secretariat, Negotiating History of the Coverage of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade with Regard to Labelling Requirements, Voluntary Standards, and
Processes and Production Methods Unrelated to the Product Characteristics, G/TBTW/1 1, . 131,
146 (Aug. 29, 1995).
28. SPS Agreement, supra note 11, 1.
29. Id. I. It is conceivable for a non-product-related PPM to be covered by SPS. Consider a
hypothetical measure forbidding the use of a pesticide in foreign agricultural production if such pesticide
is to be imported from an adjoining country. Suppose that the purpose of the measure is not that the
pesticide is harmful to the consumer, but that the wind blows the pesticide across the border into the
importing country and hurts its agriculture. Such a non-product-related PPM would be covered by SPS.
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standard (e.g., pesticide residue) or a product-related PPM (e.g., the use of
hormones in meat production).
The related/unrelated distinction is popular with commentators for its
simplicity, but is flawed for that same reason. To begin with, the assertion that
a PPM is unrelated to a product is too strong. Since no PPM is employed
without reference to some product, categorizing it as "unrelated" or "non-
related" is a misnomer. 0 Foreign processes cannot be halted at the border. As
a result, preventing products from coming across the border is the only way to
enforce PPM-based trade regulations.
A deeper problem is the assumption that consumer preferences can be
neatly divided between the physical characteristics of the product and a
bundle of other ecological or moral concerns. To be sure, the blindfolded
consumer will not be able to tell whether the fish being eaten was caught
using a driftnet. Yet in the real world, consumers do not have blindfolds on.
Once a consumer suspects that the fish was caught with a driftnet, it may be
less desirable to her. Indeed, she may not want to eat it at all. It may be
impossible to convince the sovereign consumer that her concerns about
unsustainable fishing practices are not physically related to the fish on her
plate.
Another problem with the related/unrelated distinction is evident with
regard to regulations that have multiple purposes. For example, a ban on
genetically-modified food might be used to address the alleged ecological
impact on agricultural production or the impact of ingestion on human health.
So the same regulation can be non-product-related or product-related
depending on the purpose -for which it was enacted.
Still another difficulty is that for some PPMs the process is the product.
The best example is a regulation specifying a minimum amount of recycled
content. Such a regulation defines the product and also mandates a production
process that uses recycled inputs. Yet recycled newsprint may be
indistinguishable from virgin newsprint and will be used in the same way by
the consumer.3'
Notwithstanding these conceptual dilemmas, this Article will follow the
practice of categorizing PPMs as being either product-related or non-product-
related. The Article does so because this distinction is a central part of the
contemporary debate. The focus in what follows will be on non-product-
related environmental PPMs. Generalizing about non-product-related PPMs
can be misleading because not all PPMs are equal. The next section will
introduce a taxonomy to clarify the variety of ways in which PPMs operate.
3
1
The debate on PPMs has made little progress in ten years because it conflates
too many different types of measures.
30. Arthur E. Appleton, Telecommunications Trade: Reach Out and Touch Someone?, 19 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 209, 216 (1998).
31. See J. Christopher Thomas, The Future: The Impact of Environmental Regulations on
Trade, 18 CAN.-U.S. L. 1 383, 389-90 (1992) (discussing the recycled newsprint standard).
32. This framework could also be applied to product-related PPMs.
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B. A Taxonomy of PPMs
A better appreciation of the differences between various PPMs can
improve the tenor of the debate and lay a foundation for an international
consensus. To that end, this Article presents a taxonomy of PPMs
distinguishing three distinct types: (1) the how-produced standard, (2) the
government policy standard, and (3) the producer characteristics standard. A
how-produced standard specifies the, processing method used for making the
product. For example, a law banning the importation of driftnet-caught fish is
a how-produced PPM. A government policy standard specifies laws or
regulations of a foreign government regarding the production process, or its
enforcement of them. For instance, a law banning the importation of fish from
any country that permits driftnet fishing is a government policy PPM. Such
PPMs focus on the methods used for mining, harvesting, manufacturing,
packaging, or transporting. These PPMs can.be contrasted to an import ban
that has no connection to production methods. For example, a trade measure
directed at "widget" imports to induce another country to stop drifnet fishing
is not a PPM.33
A standard that hinges on the identity of the producer or importer is not
always viewed as a PPM. For example, a law that bans fish imports from a
producer owned by a pariah government will probably be considered a plain
embargo rather than a PPM. Nevertheless, the PPM analyst will want to take
account of the producer characteristics standard for at least two reasons. First,
in specifying attributes of a producer or its contractual relations, the importing
government can seek to accomplish policy purposes similar to what might be
sought using a how-produced or a government policy PPM. Second, much of
the relevant trade law jurisprudence involves measures based on producer
characteristics. Therefore, such measures will be treated here as PPMs.
This Article uses the term "standard" to mean a product specification
that is legally required. This usage differs from that in the TBT Agreement,
where "standard" means product characteristics or product-related PPMs with
which compliance is not mandatory." While the TBT Agreement uses the
term "regulation" for "mandatory" provisions, the taxonomy laid out in this
Article uses the term "standard" rather than "regulation" for two reasons: first,
while some environmental PPMs are regulations applied equally to foreign
and domestic products, many PPMs are import bans that may not come within
the scope of TBT;31 second, the term "regulation" has a connotation of
jurisdiction to prescribe individual behavior that does not fit PPMs, which set
conditions for entry or sale that the exporter may or may not seek to meet. If
33. U.S. law bans the importation (in certain circumstances) of sport-fishing equipment from
countries whose governments have not agreed to terminate large-scale driftnet fishing by nationals
beyond the exclusive economic zone. 16 U.S.C. § 1826a (1988). This is not a PPM as defined here.
Rather, it is a trade sanction. For another example of an environmental trade sanction, see 19 U.S.C. §
1323 (1994).
34. TBT Agreement, supra note 12, Annex 1, % 2.
35. See id. 1.
2002]
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27:59
the exporter does not meet these conditions, no disadvantage is incurred other
than an inability to sell to the PPM-applying country.
A standard prescribing where a product must be produced is not a PPM.
For example, the U.S. law that bans fish (and all other) imports from Cuba is a
plain embargo rather than a PPM.16 A where-produced standard can
sometimes be disguised as a how-produced standard by using origin-neutral
language that pertains only to a particular country. Probably the most well-
known PPM in the history of trade policy was the German law of 1904
providing a tariff reduction for "large dappled mountain cattle or brown cattle
reared at a spot at least 300 meters above sea level and which have at least one
month's grazing each year at a spot at least 800 meters above sea level." '37
That is a how-produced PPM that is non-product-related. Germany apparently
wanted to give a trade concession to Switzerland without generalizing it to
other countries with whom it had trade agreements." This cattle PPM is the
classic example of the way in which a discriminatory tariff preference can be
disguised as a how-produced standard.
Although this Article looks at environmental PPMs, the suggested
taxonomy applies to other PPMs too. For example, in July 2000, the World
Diamond Congress pressed for action to combat trade in "conflict diamonds"
that are used to fund terrorism in Africa.39 The Congress urged an import ban
on diamonds from countries that have not passed redline legislation requiring
diamonds to be sealed and registered. Such a ban would be a government
policy standard. In January 2001, President Clinton issued an Executive Order
to prohibit the importation of rough diamonds from Sierra Leone unless the
particular diamond was controlled through a certificate of origin from the
Government of Sierra Leone.4 ° This is a how-produced (or who-produced)
PPM that treats like diamonds differently based on who mines and cuts them.
In presenting this PPM taxonomy, this Article argues that form matters
and that how-produced standards are preferable to government policy and
producer characteristics standards. In Part III, the Article will show that a
how-produced standard may be less likely to violate WTO rules than the other
two types of PPMs.
The government policy standard has four major faults." First, it is
coercive in that it dictates environmental policies to foreign governments.
36. 22 U.S.C. § 6032(h) (2001).
37. Memorandum on Discriminatory Tariff Classifications, League of Nations Doc. C.E.C.P.
96, at 8 (1927).
38. Robert E. Hudec, "Like Product": The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and
III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND TIE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 101,
109-11 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000).
39. Holly Burkhalter, Deadly Diamond, LEGAL TIMEs, Sept. 11, 2000, at 74; Andrew Parker,
Pledge on Move to Curb "Conflict Diamond" Sales, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2000, at 16. For recent
developments see Nicole Itano, Countries Near Agreement on process for Certification to Curb 'Blood
Diamonds,' BNA DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, Nov. 8,2001, at A21.
40. Exec. Order No. 13,194, 66 Fed. Reg. 7,389 (Jan. 23, 2001).
41. It is interesting to note that in 1927, the Swedish delegation to the World Economic
Conference pointed out that the most-favored-nation principle might be evaded by an unfounded
distinction such as the "measures taken by the authorities of the exporting State." Report and
Proceedings of the World Economic Conference, League of Nations Doc. C.356.M.129.1927.ll, at 236
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Second, this standard penalizes a private economic actor who may be doing
everything right from an environmental perspective, but whose exports remain
blocked because its good environmental behavior is not mandated by its
nation's law. Third, the government policy standard is unfair because it is
more available to large than to small countries.42 Fourth, the government
policy standard can lead to conflict because two importing countries might
impose inconsistent policy standards on an exporting country.
By contrast, the how-produced standard operates much like a simple
product standard.43 It does not coerce governments, nor does it penalize
economic actors who are willing to assure that their exports meet the
importing country's standard. Moreover, small countries can use how-
produced standards because they will almost always find willing suppliers.
For these reasons, the how-produced standard will probably not cause as much
trade tension as the government policy standard does.
The how-produced standard can be a proportionate and measured
response to a situation where importing from the other country can exacerbate
an environmental problem. For example, when a government allows the
importation of fish caught with a driftnet, the importing country signals that
such odious practices are acceptable for future trade, and so exporting country
producers may continue to use them. On the other hand when a government
bans such fish imports, it signals its objections to that method of production
and may make it less profitable." Private economic actors will then have a
new incentive to modify their environmental behavior.
A how-produced PPM could be less effective than a government policy
standard and that could be unsatisfactory to environmental regulators.4 But
this lower effectiveness needs to be balanced against the disadvantages of
being heavy-handed from the point of view of environmental policy. It is one
thing for Country I to specify a PPM for the fish that it imports from Country
E. It is quite another for Country I to say that it will not import any fish from
E unless all of E's fish catch are caught in the prescribed way. Treating
Country E unfairly may make it harder to convince E's government and
stakeholders to cooperate on environmental protection matters.
This section has developed categories of PPMs with two purposes in
mind. One is to show how PPMs influence behavior. This can be useful in
designing and implementing PPMs. The other purpose is to draw upon these
categories in explicating WTO law in Part III. The PPM taxonomy will be
helpful in seeing how WTO law has evolved and where it might be going.
(1927). Thus, concerns about the government policy standard go back to one of the earliest international
conferences on trade policy.
42. In order for a government policy standard to influence a foreign government, the
standard-writing country must purchase a large share of the target production. As the world's largest
importer, the United States is also the most frequent user of government policy standards.
43. Joahne Scott, On Kith and Kin (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and
WTO, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE?
139 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., Ist ed. 2000).
44. Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction - An Illusory Basis for
Disciplining "Unilateralism" in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 249, 272-73 (2000).
45. Chang, supra note 17, at 2177-85.
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Before moving to Part III, however, the Article will explain why
environmental PPMs are needed for environmental protection.
C. Why Environmental PPMs Are Needed
Non-product-related PPMs are a response to humankind's shared
habitation on the planet. The driftnet fishing example is just one of a wide
array of concerns that consumers may have about the side effects of
production. Various terms are used to describe this concern, such as the
"environmental profile" of a product or its "ecological footprint." Citizens and
consumers have these concerns because the public in one country can be
affected by the production methods used in another.
While it is easy to criticize PPMs as a manifestation of eco-imperialism,
that characterization is too simplistic. PPMs are a symptom of the
dysfunctions in international environmental governance. Among the biggest
problems are poor stewardship of the global commons, lack of liability for
transboundary environmental harms, and free riding in treaties. PPMs are an
inevitable response to the disagreements between countries at different stages
of development. Addressing these root causes would not only obviate many
PPMs, but could also improve prospects for economic growth and
environmental protection.
PPMs have always been a feature of environmental law. For example, in
1906, the U.S. Congress passed a law banning the landing of sponges taken by
means of a diving apparatus from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. ' The
diving techniques at issue were destructive of the sponge bed, as compared to
the use of simple hooks. Another example comes from 1925, when a treaty
between Mexico and the United States set up an International Fisheries
Commission to conserve marine life in the Pacific Ocean. The treaty
committed the parties to refuse the landing of any fish taken in violation of the
Commission's regulations.'7 This treaty is noteworthy in demonstrating the
early acceptance by Mexico of the application of PPMs to imported fish.
Another early example of a trade PPM occurred in the 1931 treaty between
Denmark and Sweden to protect migratory birds. This treaty forbade the use
of nets for catching seabirds and prohibited the sale or transport of such birds
when caught in nets.
48
Even when a treaty is in place, a government may use unilateral trade
measures to seek to enhance the treaty's effectiveness. For instance, in 1950
the United States enacted a law prohibiting the import of whale products taken
46. An Act To Regulate the Landing, Delivery, Cure, and Sale of Sponges, ch. 3442, 34 Stat.
313 (1906) (repealed 1914). The Act had an exception for sponges taken in deep water between October
and May. The application of this Act to foreign commerce was held constitutional in The Abby Dodge,
223 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1912).
47. Convention to Prevent Smuggling and for Certain Other Objects, Dec. 23, 1925, U.S.-
Mex., arts. 10-12, 48 L.N.T.S. 444 (no longer in force).
48. Agreement regarding certain provisions for the Protection of Migratory Game-Birds, Oct.
9, 1931, Den.-Swed., art. 2, 126 L.N.T.S. 259.
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in violation of the Whaling Convention.49 The Whaling Convention itself did
not provide for the use of trade measures as a means of enforcement. 0
Because many important international environmental treaties have been
developed during the past three decades, there is sometimes a tendency to
assume that any significant transborder environmental problem will lead to a
treaty that averts the need for unilateral PPMs. Throughout the 1990s this
belief was a common theme in the criticism of PPMs, which assumed that
countries like the United States were choosing national action over equally
available multilateral action." But the reality is that effective, broad-
membership treaties are difficult to achieve.52 Furthermore, treatymaking
negotiations sometimes succeed because leading countries have manifested a
willingness to act alone if necessary, a process called "policy-forging"
unilateralism by Laurence Boisson de Chazournes 3
In their introductory essay to The Greening of World Trade Issues in
1992, Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst framed the issue properly. They
said that "[i]f all countries participated in all international environmental
agreements, there would be nothing more to add."'5 Yet as Anderson and
Blackhurst acknowledge in that seminal volume, many environmental
problems are not addressed by treaties with sufficient country membership
and compliance."
The protection of migratory sea turtles is an example of a long-
recognized problem for which international legislation emerged slowly. As
early as 1924, the Pan-Pacific Food Conservation Conference warned that
49. 16 U.S.C. § 916c(a) (1994).
50. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling with Schedule of Whaling
Regulations, Dec. 2, 1946, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
51. GATT Secretariat, Trade and the Environment, I INTERNATIONAL TRADE 90-91, at 23-
25, 35-36 (1992).
52. The earliest analysis of the difficulty in attaining an environmental treaty that has come to
my attention is Charles Edward Fryer, International Regulation of the Fisheries of the High Seas, 28
BULL. OF THE BUREAU OF FIsHERIEs 91 (1908). Fryer explains that "two nations whose fishermen
practice different methods of fishing for the same kind of fish will not always admit that the same
necessity exists for its protection or that the remedy is the appropriate one." Id at 95. For more recent
discussions of the difficulties governments sometimes have in achieving environmental agreements, see
PETER 11 SAND, LESSONS LEARNED IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANcE 5-14 (1990);
LAWRENCE E. SUssKm, ENvIRoNmENTAL DIPLOMACY 11-42 (1994); Richard Blackhurst & Arvind
Subramanian, Promoting Multilateral Cooperation on the Environment, in THE GREENING OF WORLD
TRADE ISSUES 247, 247-60 (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992). A current example of the
difficulty of achieving an environmental agreement is the negotiations to improve the Kyoto Protocol on
climate change so that more governments will ratify it, thereby raising the number of governments
ratifying the Protocol beyond the current number of 40. See also Kal Raustiala, Compliance and
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation, 32 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 387, 392-94
(discussing the relationship among compliance, implementation, and effectiveness of international
regulatory cooperation).
53. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Unilateralism andEnvironmental Protection: Issues of
Perception and Reality of Issues, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 315, 317, 325 (2000). In policy-forging
unilateralism, the author of the measure uses it to reshape a legal regime. De Chazournes lists several
examples from the history of environmental policymaking, the earliest being the Russian decree of 1893
to forbid the hunting of fur seals just outside Russian territorial waters. Id at 332.
54. Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst, Trade, the Environment and Public Policy, in THE
GREENING OF WORLD TRADE ISSUES, supra note 52, at 3, 20.
55. See generally id.
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"action is necessary to save the marine turtles of various countries from
commercial, if not actual extinction." 6 In 1979, the World Conference on Sea
Turtle Conservation called for international and national fishery commissions
to "promulgate regulations requiring the use of gear which precludes the
capture of sea turtles . . ." and for the U.N. Environment Programme and the
Food and Agriculture Organization to make U.S. technology for turtle-safe
shrimping available to world fishing fleets." In 1989, the U.S. Congress
directed the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations as soon as possible with
all foreign governments who have nationals engaged in commercial fishing
that may adversely affect sea turtles." Yet it was not until 1996 that
governments succeeded in negotiating the first treaty on sea turtle
conservation, and this did not occur until after the U.S. government had
banned shrimp from countries whose vessels were not using turtle excluder
devices (TEDs).59
Recently, the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization's Committee on
Fisheries gave a qualified endorsement to trade PPMs. The Committee
recommended that governments consider using trade PPMs to address "illegal,
unreported and unregulated" (JUU) fishing in world fisheries. Specifically, the
Committee stated:
States should take all steps necessary, consistent with international law, to prevent fish
caught by vessels identified by the relevant regional fisheries management organization
to have been engaged in IUU fishing [from] being traded or imported into their
territories.... Trade-related measures should be adopted and implemented in accordance
with international law, including principles, rights and obligations established in WTO
Agreements, and implemented in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory manner....
Unilateral trade-related measures should be avoided.
60
If other instruments were immediately available to deter harmful fishing, the
Committee probably would not have endorsed controversial trade measures.
Of course, environmental negotiations will not always need the fillip of
threatened trade measures. Most environmental treaties were achieved without
any inducement by trade measures. Yet trade measures can sometimes be
useful to address the problem of free riders." For example, the Montreal
Protocol on Ozone prohibits trade in controlled substances with non-parties
(unless they are in full compliance with the Protocol's control measures). 2
56. 29 M-PAc. MAG. 182, 183 (Jan. 1925).
57. BIOLOGY AND CONSERVATION OF SEA TURTLES, Proceedings of the World Conference on
Sea Turtle Conservation 582 (Karen A. Bjomdal ed., 1981).
58. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609(a)(2), 103 Stat. 1037 (1990).
59. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, Dec. 1,
1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-48, (1998), available at http://www.seaturtle.orgiac. The import bans
on shrimp began in 1991. U.S. Customs Service Memorandum Regarding Importations of Shrimp from
Suriname, May 2, 1991. The turtle excluder device (TED) is a trapdoor installed inside a trawling net
that allows shrimp to pass to the back of the net while directing sea turtles out of the net.
60. International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing, $ 66 (June 23, 2001), available at http://www.fao.org/fi.
61. Jennifer A. Bernazani, The Eagle, The Turtle, The Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for
the Future of Environmental Trade Measures, 15 CONN. J. INT'L L. 207, 211-12 (2000).
62. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M.
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This trade provision is considered to be an important factor in eliciting the
wide membership of this treaty.' Another example is dolphin conservation.
Research by Richard Parker shows that the threat of trade leverage was crucial
to getting a dolphin conservation program started in the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission."
When the first-best option of multilateral cooperation is unavailable, an
affected government may consider using a trade PPM to address transborder
problems indirectly. Precisely because it is so indirect, such a PPM may be
inefficient. Yet the most efficient measures are only available to a government
with prescriptive jurisdiction over the environmentally damaging process. So
if the producing country's government fails to use its own direct regulatory
instruments, other affected country governments will be left with less efficient
instruments.
In deciding whether to use such a PPM, a government may consider not
only the consequential impact but also the demonstration effect of acting to
address an environmental problem. One early recognition of the value of
setting a good example involved bird hunting. In the early twentieth century,
millions of birds were being killed for their plumage . 5 Bird protection groups
in Great Britain sought a ban on feather imports, but the ban was opposed on
the grounds that this solitary action would be insufficient to effectuate bird
preservation. One essayist responded in 1909 to this claim by saying:
[I]f the importation into our country is stopped, other Governments may follow suit.
Representations to foreign countries are much more likely to be effectual if made by a
Government which has had the courage of its convictions, and has already put its
principles into practice.
66
By 1914, Great Britain took action to ban the importation of certain
types of bird plumage.67 Similar action in other countries reduced traffic in
birds and led to changes in fashion that reduced demand for feathers.
A close analysis of the main anti-PPM argument shows that it leads to
untenable conclusions. Some commentators say that an environmental PPM is
wrong because it seeks to force changes in practices occurring in foreign
countries. Yet if that were true, it would also be true for product-related PPMs
such as meat safety rules, which work by eliciting changes in production
practices in other countries. 9 The same concern would also apply to simple
1550, and as adjusted thereafter, art. 4, available at http://www.unep.org/ozone/montt.htm.
63. DUNCAN BRACK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 54-58 (1996);
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE MEASURES IN
MULTILATERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 80-81 (1999).
64. Richard Parker, The Case for Environmental Trade Sanctions, 7 WIDENERL. SYMP. . 21,
25 (2001).
65. Joseph Kastner, Long Before Furs, It Was Feathers that Stirred Reformist Ire,
SMrnHsONIAN, July 1994, at 96.
66. A- HOLTE MACPHERSON, LEGISLATION FOR THE PROTECTION OF BIRDS 29 (1909).
67. An Act to amend the Customs Tariff, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 3 (1907) (Eng.).
68. See generally ROBIN W. DOUGHTY, FEATHER FASHIONS AND BIRD PRESERVATION (1975).
69. David M. Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and
Environment Debate, 41 VA. 3. INT'LL. 279,311,343 (2001).
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product standards, such as automobile safety requirements, that regularly
induce foreign manufacturers to adapt their assembly lines.70 The WTO
Agreement itself contains thirty-three pages of textile tariff classifications, and
these minor differences may encourage producers to design their products to
meet one standard rather than the other.7' Since such normal standard-setting
cannot possibly be prohibited by WTO rules, the initial premise that WTO
rules prohibit standard-setting that seeks to change foreign manufacturing
practice must be faulty. The fact that a government regulation in Country I
will induce businesses in Country E to change their behavior does not render
I's regulation illegitimate under WTO rules.
Of course, any PPM-product-related or not-should be subjected to
scrutiny by the WTO to determine whether it is protectionist.' The key
question to ask is whether the importing country government has a solid
environmental rationale for being concerned about production practices in the
exporting country. The fact that domestic producers might want foreign
producers to be subject to the same environmental PPM may be a warning
signal of protectionist intent but is not itself conclusive. In many instances, the
importing country will have an environmental reason to want other countries
to take comparable action to safeguard a shared natural resource.
Because environmental PPMs are typically employed to correct market
failure, they increase global economic efficiency when well-designed.' Not
every country will necessarily be better off as a result, however. Trade
measures taken for environmental purposes can cause adverse economic
effects on exporting countries. When such exporting countries are less
developed, PPMs could easily exacerbate global income inequities.
Policymakers using PPMs ought to be sensitive to how much of the
financial burden for ecological protection is being shifted. More examination
is needed of the costs imposed by PPMs on less developed countries. When
the environmental benefits of a PPM accrue to the entire world, the costs
should be borne primarily by the richer countries, which should either pay
70. For example, the U.S. government will soon require that car trunks have inside releases.
Passenger Cars Must Have Trunk Releases To Avoid Entrapment Under New Standard, BNA DAILY
REP. FOREXECUTIVES, Oct. 18, 2000, at A36. This new standard will surely force foreign automakers to
redesign their products.
71. WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, Annex, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex IA, LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 3, at 85. Some of these categories read like PPMs (e.g., 5702.10).
72. Daniel P. Blank, Target-Based Environmental Trade Measures: A Proposal for the New
WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 119 (1996).
73. For example, in the shrimp-turtle controversy, a minor change in shrimping practices was
needed to safeguard sea turtles. If turtles are appropriately valued at zero, then changing the practices
would decrease global output. On the other hand, with any reasonable valuation, the cost of saving the
sea turtle is worth the added fishing cost of using a turtle excluder device. In the beginning, the shrimp-
turtle clash may have resulted from different valuations placed on turtles, but by the time the dispute got
to the WTO, all of the complaining governments were carrying out programs to protect turtles. What
was disputed was whether the United States had an obligation under trade rules to allow in all shrimp
regardless of whether turtles were being killed-in other words, whether any PPM was WTO-legal. The
plaintiff countries were not arguing that turtles were unworthy of protection. Their argument was that
the United States was keeping out more shrimp than was warranted because of a badly designed import
ban. Indeed, one of the plaintiffs, Thailand, had already implemented a sufficient conservation program
to meet the U.S. requirements and was exporting shrimp to the United States.
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more for the good in question,7' or provide financial or technology transfers to
poor societies to enable them to efficiently comply with the PPM requirement.
Current mechanisms do not provide for fair burden sharing.
In summary, Part II explains why trade measures are sometimes needed
and presents the author's taxonomy of PPMs. The government policy standard
is contrasted with the how-produced standard, and the latter is shown to be a
better approach. Governments use environmental PPMs in treaties and
national law in order to achieve conservation or anti-pollution goals. PPMs
aimed at foreign governments are indirect, and thus are often blunt tools.
Nevertheless, resort to such PPMs may be better than doing nothing in the
absence of multilateral cooperation.
III. THE WTO LAW OF PPMS
Part III analyzes how WTO rules supervise PPMs applied to imports. If
a WTO Member government believes that a PPM in another WTO Member
country violates trade rules, the complaining government may raise the issue
in WTO dispute settlement.75 A three-person panel will be appointed, which
will review briefs, hold oral hearings, and issue a decision in about six
months.7' This panel's decision may be appealed by either a plaintiff
government or the defendant government to the WTO Appellate Body, which
assigns three of its jurists to hear the appeal and issues a final ruling in about
sixty days. The Appellate Body may uphold, modify, or reverse the legal
findings and conclusions of the panel.' The reports of the panel and the
Appellate Body are then automatically adopted by the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body, which consists of delegates of all of the WTO Member
countries. 71 At that point, defendant governments are under a treaty obligation
to comply promptly.79 Of course, the drafters of the WTO recognized the
74. Generally one would assume that if U.S. law imposes a PPM on the harvesting of shrimp,
then the cost of meeting that PPM would be paid for by the consumers of shrimp in the United States. In
other words, the producers of shrimp in the United States and the exporters of shrimp to the United
States would be able to pass on the added costs of turtle safety to consumers. It is possible for the
foreign supplier to be put at a competitive disadvantage if the technology of safeguarding turtles is more
costly in the developing country than in the United States.
75. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
[hereinafter DSU], Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, art. 3, LIE:GALT xTs, supra note 3, at 355.
76. lId arts. 6-18.
77. Id art. 17.
78. Id. arts. 16.4, 17.14. In the GATT, panel reports were recommendations to the
governments that had to be adopted by the GATT Council in order to give life to these judicial
decisions. The same practice continues in the WTO, but the decision rule has been changed to provide
for adoption unless all governments disagree. The underlying idea is that a panel cannot tell
governments what to do. The governments (including the defendant government) themselves transform
the panel's decision into "law" by adopting it. It is possible for the Dispute Settlement Body to decide
by consensus not to adopt a report, but this has never happened. For this to occur, the government
winning the dispute would have to join a consensus to put aside its victory. In one instance in the banana
dispute, a compliance panel report was not adopted because neither party put the question of adoption on
the Body's agenda.
79. Id. art. 21.1 (stating that prompt compliance is essential). In addition, the DSU states that
Appellate Body reports shall be adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body and "unconditionally accepted
by the parties to the dispute." Id art. 17.14. In a recent DSU Article 21.3 arbitration to set the reasonable
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possibility that a government might not comply and that the WTO (or a
winning plaintiff) has no way to compel compliance by seeking court orders
within the defendant government's national legal system. In an effort to
induce compliance, the WTO rules provide for trade retaliation by a winning
plaintiff government against a non-complying defendant government. 0 The
experience so far demonstrates a good recordof compliance. 81
Many commentators contend that WTO rules do not permit importing
governments to make distinctions based on the production process. The
quotations below demonstrate how widespread the view is that PPMs are
illegal under trade rules.' This list is balanced in containing commentators
who favor the WTO's anti-PPM stance and those who oppose it.
This [shrimp] ban was a unilateral trade measure, in clear contradiction of the WTO
principle that Bproduction and processing methods are not valid reasons for product
differentiation. (Maria Amparo Albfin, Ecuadorean Centre for Environmental Law,
1998.)
The traditional understanding of the provisions of the GATT is that they recognize only
the physical characteristics of a product, not how it is made. There is a sound economic
reason for this.84 (Alan Oxley, Former Ambassador of Australia to the GATT, 1999.)
GATT rules require that imported and domestically produced goods be treated equally
and that foreign goods not be subject to import restrictions on the basis of "production
processes and methods"-PPMs-used in their manufacture.8 5 (I.M. Destler & Peter J.
Balint, Institute for International Economics, 1999.)
period of time for implementing a panel report, Appellate Body Member Florentino P. Feliciano
explained, "Implementation, in essence, consists of bringing the measure held to be inconsistent with the
obligations of the WTO Member concerned under particular provisions of a particular covered
agreement, into conformity with those same provisions." Award of the Arbitrator, Argentina - Measures
Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and the Import of Finished Leather, Arbitration under Article
21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
WT/DS155/10, 40 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (emphasis added). The decision
granted Argentina a little over a year to correct its WTO violation. See also Christine Gray, Types of
Remedies in ICJ Cases: Lessons for the WTO?, in IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETrLE MENT
PROCEDURES: ISSUES AND LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND
TRIBUNALS 401, 411 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000) (contending that once a WTO case has been decided, the
option to pay compensation rather than comply is no longer lawfully available under WTO rules).
80. DSU, supra note 75, art. 22.6. Because of this possibility of retaliation, WTO decisions
are sometimes viewed as more binding than many other decisions rendered by international courts or
tribunals.
81. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Update of WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, November 7,
2001, WT/DS/OV/2, available at http://www.wto.org.
82. Not all commentators were so quick to assume that PPMs violate GATT rules. In his
treatise of 1989, John Jackson suggests that the Article XX exceptions imply a focus on the product
itself, and not on the production process. But he goes on to add that it might be possible to argue the
contrary, and that the issue has not been squarely posed in dispute settlement. JOHN JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 209 (Paperback Edition, 1992). It should be noted that many trade law
analysts have stated that PPMs are legal under WTO rules.
83. Maria Amparo Albfin, Trading Sovereignty: Ecuador's Strategic Silence on the Shrimp
Ban, 2 BRIDGES BETWEEN TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Apr.-May 1998, at 13.
84. Alan Oxley, Poor Environmental Policy: The Fundamental Problem in the "Trade and
Environment" Debate, in THE NEXT TRADE NEGOTIATING ROUND: EXAMINING THE AGENDA FOR
SEATTLE 63, 71 (Jagdish Bhagwati ed., 1999).
85. I.M. DESTLER & PETER J. BALINT, THE NEW POLITICS OF AMERICAN TRADE: TRADE,
LABOR, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 35 (1999).
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One of the basic principles of the WTO is that member countries may not discriminate
between "like products." This has hitherto normally been interpreted as preventing
discrimination between goods on the basis of how they are produced. . . . To allow
discrimination on the basis of production and processing methods (PPMs), there would
have to be a re-interpretation of the crucial term "like product."8 (House of Lords, Select
Committee on European Communities, 2000.)
And, we noted, WTO law does not allow countries to discriminate against like products,
whatever their different environmental impacts. This prohibition makes little
environmental sense. The way a product is produced is one of the three central questions
for an environmental manager.87 (U.N. Environmental Programme & International
Institute for Sustainable Development, 2000.)
The WTO agreed in the Uruguay Round that, although states can control the import of
final products that are damaging to health and environment, they cannot restrict the
import of goods on the grounds that they have been produced using harmfil process and
production methods (PPMs). 8s (Bill Jordan, International Confederation for Free Trade
Unions, 2001.)
WTO rules do not allow its members to discriminate between so-called "like products."
This is widely interpreted as implying they cannot discriminate between goods on the
basis of non-product related process and production methods (PPMs).s9 (European
Commission, 2001.)
Expressed in the "like product" norm, where products are seen to be equivalent, their
origin-or their production processes and methods (PPMs) background-may not
constitute any grounds for discriminating treatment through national policy.90 (Martin
Weber, Southampton University, 2001.)
The position of most developing countries is that the TBT Agreement prohibits the use of
standards based on non-product-related PPMs because its definition of standards does not
include those that are based on such PPMs and product differentiation on these grounds is
not allowed by GATTIWTO jurisprudence.9' (Jos6 Maria Figueres Olsen, et al., World
Economic Forum, 2001.)
What is the authority for this widely-shared opinion? Certainly, the text
of the GATT does not forbid national regulations, taxes, tariffs, or import bans
based on the production process. On the contrary, the GATT allows
governments to discriminate against imports made in prohibited ways. For
example, governments can take customs action against an imported article
made using a subsidy, or whose producer prices it too low, or whose producer
86. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COIvMITTE ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION: THE EU MANDATE AFTER SEATTLE, June 13, 2000, T 223-24.
87. U.N. ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME & INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE: A HANDBOOK 43 (2000).
88. Bill Jordan, Building a WTO That Can Contribute Effectively to Economic and Social
Development Worldvide, in THE ROLE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
243, 254 (Gary P. Sampson ed., 2001).
89. European Commission, Towards Sustainable Trade, Trade Policy Dialogue with Civil
Society, Ad-Hoc Meeting on PPMs, 31 May 2001, Draft Agenda, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/tradecsc/draftagd_ppm.htm.
90. Martin Weber, Competing Political Visions: WTO Governance and Green Politics, 1
GLOB. ENVTL. POL. 92, 99 (2001) (internal citation omitted).
91. Jos6 Maria Figueres Olsen, Jos6 Manuel Salazar-)Xrinachs, & M6nica Araya, Trade and
Environment at the World Trade Organization: The Need for a Constructive Dialogue, in THE ROLE OF
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 88, at 155, 174. The three
authors, from Costa Rica, are reporting opinions expressed by others.
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does not have the requisite intellectual property licenses.9 The consumer may
not agree with the governmental decision that these methods of production
should be attacked with trade measures. The subsidized, low-cost imported
fish will taste as good as the higher-cost domestic fish. Nevertheless, the
GATT permits governments to impose PPMs of this sort despite the fact that
the behavior being complained about has no effect on the product as such.
Even without explicit language, however, GATT rules may still prohibit
environmental PPMs. As noted above, many commentators so contend. Over
the years, the GATT Secretariat has taken both sides of the debate. When it
first addressed the matter in 1971, the Secretariat explained:
A shared resource, such as a lake or the atmosphere, which is being polluted by foreign
producers may give rise to restrictions on trade in the product of that process justifiable
on grounds of the public interest in the importing country of control over a process
carried out in an adjacent or nearby country.-
Twenty years later, after environmental concerns grew in importance,
the GATT Secretariat shifted its stance and asserted that "[i]n principle, it is
not possible under GATT's rules to make access to one's own market
dependent on the domestic environmental policies or practices of the
exporting country."9  Then WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero
reaffirmed this negative view when he stated in a 1997 speech:
What a country cannot do under WTO rules, however, is apply trade restrictions to
attempt to change the process and production methods - or other policies - of its trading
partners. Why? Basically because the issue of production and process methods lies within
the sovereign jurisdiction of each country.
95
Even today, the WTO Secretariat continues to insist that PPMs violate
trade rules. The WTO website states:
The WTO agreements are interpreted to say two important things. First, trade restrictions
cannot be imposed on a product purely because of the way it has been produced. Second,
one country cannot reach out beyond its own territory to impose its standards on another
country.96
92. GATT, supra note 3, arts. VI:3, VI:2, XX(d). Article VI:3 implicitly authorizes
countervailing duties against imports produced with the help of government subsidies. Article VL2
authorizes antidumping duties against dumped products. Article XX(d) implicitly authorizes trade
measures to protect patents, trademarks, and copyrights.
93. GATT, INDusTRIAL POLLUTION CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, GATT Studies in
International Trade No. 1, July 1971 (emphasis added).
94. GATT Secretariat, supra note 51, at 23.
95. Renato Ruggiero, A Shared Responsibility: Global Policy Coherence for our Global Age,
Address to the Conference on "Globalization as a Challenge for German Business: Export Opportunities
for Small and Medium-sized Companies in the Environmental Field," (Dec. 9, 1997), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/news.e/sprre/bonne.htm.
96. TRADING INTO THE FUTURE: THE INTRODUCTION TO TEE WTO 47 (2d ed., 1999),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis-e/tif e/tif e.htm. In November 2001, the
WTO Secretariat published an online "resource booklet" for the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha,
Qatar. It states:
The WTO, like its predecessor the GAIT, does not permit its Members to
distinguish between products that have the same characteristics ("like"
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This Article cites the WTO Director-General and the WTO Secretariat not
because they have any role in issuing formal interpretations of WTO law.
They do not. Rather, the point being made is that the words of these
international officials will tend to influence and inform public opinion, and
insufficient care is being taken to make legally accurate pronouncements.
In the next section, this Article will attempt to prove the contention that
the WTO does not prohibit PPMs and to show that the dogma quoted above is
incorrect. The central WTO agreement at issue is the GATT, which addresses
trade in goods. The GATT caselaw on PPMs is nuanced and does not point to
a prohibition on the use of such environmental instruments. Unless otherwise
noted, all of the panel decisions discussed below have been adopted by the
governments. Some of these decisions-issued between 1952 and 1994-
were products of the GATT trading system. The rest of the decisions-issued
between 1996 and 2001-are products of the current WTO system. WTO
panels commonly rely on earlier decisions, including decisions authored by
GATT panelsY
A. Structure of GA TT Obligations
The structure of GATT obligations is as follows: A PPM could violate
GATT Article I (most-favored-nation), or GATT Article III (national
treatment), or GATT Article XI (elimination of quantitative restrictions). 9 If
products) based on the differences in the way they were produced. Why?
Because to do so would bring the rules into conflict with the very basis of the
gains from trade: differences in comparative advantage.
THE WTO . . . WHY IT MATTERS: A GUIDE FOR OFFICIALS, LEGISLATORS, CIVIL SocIETY AND ALL
THOSE INTERESTED IN INIERNATIONAL TRADE AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 33 (2001) available at
http://www-heva.wto-ministerial.orglenglish/thewto-e/minist_elmin0l_e/min0l-e.htm.
97. The Appellate Body has stated that while not binding in subsequent disputes, adopted
panel reports should be taken into account by panels where they are relevant to any dispute. Report of
the Appellate Body on Japanese Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DSS/AB/R, at 15-16 (Oct. 4, 1996)
[hereinafter Appellate Body Japanese Alcoholic Beverages Report] available at http://www.wto.org.
98. GATT Article I (General Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment) provides in part:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with
importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer of payments for
imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges,
and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and
exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article I,
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any
product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all
other contracting parties.
GATT, supra note 3, art. 1, 1.
GATT Article III (National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation) provides in part:
1. The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws,
regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase,
transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the
mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied
to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.
2. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or
other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like
domestic products....
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so, it would be reviewed under the General Exceptions in Article XX when
there is an applicable exception." GATT Article I requires parties to treat a
product of another party no less favorably than the like product of any other
party. GATT Article III requires treating imported products from a party no
less favorably than like domestic products. GATT Article XI prohibits import
and export bans and quotas (subject to certain exceptions not relevant here).
GATT Article XX provides for General Exceptions to the entire Agreement.
The relationship between the GATT disciplines and Article XX is
subject to different interpretations. One school of thought is that GATT
Articles I, III, and XI impose disciplines on governments, and that GATT
Article XX provides exceptions to those disciplines. Whether a national
measure is in conformity with the GATT can only be determined by looking
at both the disciplines and the exceptions in tandem. Viewed in this way,
when a measure fails to provide national treatment, it should not be called a
4. The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded
to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements
affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
5. No contracting party shall establish or maintain any internal quantitative regulation
relating to the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions
which requires, directly or indirectly, that any specified amount or proportion of any
product which is the subject of the regulation must be supplied from domestic sources....
7. No internal quantitative regulation relating to the mixture, processing or use of
products in specified amounts or proportions shall be applied in such a manner as to
allocate any such amount or proportion among external sources of supply.
Id. at art. 3.
GATT Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) provides in part:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory
of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product
destined for the territory of any other contracting party.
Id. at art. 11.
99. GATT Article XX (General Exceptions) provides in part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in
this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health....
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to customs enforcement,
the enforcement of monopolies operated under paragraph 4 of Article II and Article
XVII, the protection of patents, trade marks and copyrights, and the prevention of
deceptive practices;
(e) relating to the products of prison labour;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
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GATT violation merely because it violates Article III; a determination of
GATT status requires a review of Article XX too.
The opposing school of thought is that GATT Articles I, III, and XI
grant (or delineate) "rights" of a WTO member country to have the exports of
its private actors accepted by other WTO member countries. Viewed in this
way, the Article I, III or XI rights of the exporting country will need to be
weighed against the Article XX rights of the importing country to rely upon
one of the listed exceptions. Acting inconsistently with Article I constitutes a
GATT violation, but it might be excusable by Article XX.
The WTO Appellate Body aligns itself with the second school. In the
U.S. Gasoline case, the Appellate Body held that "if those [Article XX]
exceptions are not to be abused or misused, in other words, the measures
falling within the particular exceptions must be applied reasonably, with due
regard both to the legal duties of the parties claiming the exception and the
legal rights of the other parties concemed."' In the U.S. Shrimp-Turtle case,
the Appellate Body stated that
WTO Members need to maintain a balance of rights and obligations between the right of
a Member to invoke one or another of the exceptions in Article XX, specified in
paragraphs (a) to (), on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members
under the GATT 1994, on the other hand. Exercise by one Member of this right to invoke
an exception, such as Article XX(g), if abused or misused, will, to that extent, erode or
render naught the substantive treaty rights in, for example, Article XI:1, of other
Members.' 0 '
The Appellate Body did not explain why Article XI:1 provides a
"substantive" right, while Article XX does not. More fundamentally, the
Appellate Body does not explain how Article XI: 1 confers a "right" on any
exporting government. Its exporter-oriented perspective can also be seen in
the Japan Alcoholic Beverages case where the Appellate Body alludes to the
"sheltering scope" of Article 11I.102 This language seems to suggest that Article
III shields measures from GATT review by conferring a right to undertake
them.
By using the language of rights in this way, the Appellate Body weakens
the General Exceptions of Article XX.13 If the exporting country has a WTO
"right" to have its exports accepted, then there will be a tendency to interpret
100. Report of the Appellate Body Conceming United States Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, at 21-22 (Apr. 29, 1996) available at http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter Appellate Body Gasoline Report].
101. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 156 (emphasis added). See also
id. 159 (discussing the "competing rights" under Articles XI and XX); id. 181-82 (suggesting that
the U.S. import ban results in a suspension of the treaty rights of other WTO Members).
102. The Appellate Body says: "The broad purpose of Article HI of avoiding protectionism
must be remembered when considering the relationship between Article Im and other provisions of the
WTO Agreement.... The sheltering scope of Article HI is not limited to products that are the subject of
tariff concessions under Article H." Appellate Body Japanese Alcoholic Beverages Report, supra note
97, at 17.
103. To be sure, the DSU employs the term "rights." For example, Article 3.2 states: "The
dispute settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations
of Members under the covered agreements ..." DSU, supra note 75, art. 3.2.
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Article XX narrowly and begrudgingly so as not to interfere with that putative
right. In characterizing Article XI as "substantive," while implying that
Article XX is not, the Appellate Body positions the two provisions at different
levels. The Appellate Body thus makes it easier for panels to ignore the
overriding injunction of Article XX, which provides that, subject to certain
requirements, "nothing" in the GATT shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement of listed measures.
A recent decision by a WTO arbitral panel, in the Brazil Aircraft case,
illustrates the tendency to minimize Article XX.'° In that case, the panel had
to interpret item (k) of Annex I to the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM). Item (k) contains a rule and an exception."5
Looking at item (k), the panel said that "[a] possible justification under item
(k), like a justification under Article XX of the GATT 1994, does not change
the legal nature of the measure. ' While this may be a good analysis for the
SCM Agreement, it would be a troublesome analysis for the GATT because a
justification of a measure under Article XX does change its legal status. An
environmental measure that is inconsistent with GATT Article II, and might
therefore violate the GATT, is nevertheless GATT-compliant if it can be
justified under Article XX. Therefore, Article XX does change the "legal
nature of the measure" in the sense that it lays out a test for environmentally
justified measures that the panel is legally bound to apply. Unfortunately,
under current WTO jurisprudence, the implication of Article XX must be
characterized less generously.
This issue of orientation is noted at the start because it may facilitate the
understanding of PPM jurisprudence presented below. The first section will
104. Decision by the Arbitrators Concerning Recourse to Arbitration by Brazil under Article
22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WTIDS46/ARB (Aug. 28, 2000), available at
http:// www.wto.org [hereinafter Brazil Aircraft Article 22 Arbitration Report]. The arbitrator's decision
is to be accepted by the parties as final. DSU, supra note 75, art. 22.7. The purpose of this arbitration
was to review Canada's proposed level of countermeasures against Brazil. Canada was entitled to take
countermeasures in response to Brazil's non-compliance with WTO rules in the Aircraft dispute. The
arbitrators authorized $344 million (Canadian) which Canada has not yet imposed.
105. Item (k), in the illustrative list of export subsidies, states that:
The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting under the
authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which they actually have
to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they borrowed on international
capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same maturity and other credit terms and
denominated in the same currency as the export credit), or the payment by them of all or
part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so
far as they are used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms.
Provided, however, that if a Member is a party to an international undertaking on official
export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this Agreement are parties as
of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has been adopted by those original
Members), or if in practice a Member applies the interest rates provisions of the relevant
undertaking, an export credit practice which is in conformity with those provisions shall
not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement.
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex IA,
Annex I (of SCM Agreement), Item (k), LEGAL TEXT, supra note 3, at 267.
106. Brazil Aircraft Article 22 Arbitration Report, supra note 104, 3.39. Article XX was not
an issue in this case so this analogy is dicta.
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consider GATT Article I, the next section Article III, and the last section
Article XX. The Article XI caselaw has not explicitly addressed PPMs
because a PPM-based import ban would clearly violate Article XI.
As a reference point in examining the cases to be discussed below, Table
I lists the PPM cases and the type of PPM used.
Table I
Category of PPM Used in GATT/WTO Cases
How-Produced Automotive Spring Assemblies









B. GATTArticle I- Most Favored Nation (MFN) Rule
GATT Article 1:1 (General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment) provides
that with respect to customs duties, taxes, regulations, and import rules, any
advantage or favor granted by a Party to any product shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the "like" product of all other Parties.107
This provision means that a WTO Member government cannot discriminate
by treating the product of one WTO Member country better than the like
product of another member country. The decision as to whether two products
are "like" will often determine the outcome of a case because Article I does
not prohibit differential treatment of unlike products.
One of the earliest GATT decisions, "Belgian Family Allowances,"
considered whether a PPM violated Article ."03 At issue was a Belgian tax on
imports purchased by local government bodies."° The six-percent tax was
devoted to the family allowance program in Belgium that was otherwise
funded by employer taxes.' Not every country, however, was subject to the
107. For exact text, see supra note 98.
108. Belgian Family Allowances, GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 59-62 (1953).
109. Id. 1.
110. Robert E. Hudec, The GAYl Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS ON
THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 17,42 (Robert E. Hudec ed., 1999).
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import tax. An exemption was available for countries that imposed an
employer tax for family allowances similar to Belgium's tax."' The two
plaintiff governments, Denmark and Norway, complained that the tax violated
Article I because an exemption had been given to Sweden but not to them,
even though they had similar family allowance programs.12 The panel sided
with the plaintiffs, but on broader grounds. The panel reasoned that since
Belgium had granted the exemption to some GATT parties, Article I required
Belgium to grant the exemption to every other GATT party regardless of
whether a government qualified for the exemption by having a similar family
allowance program."'3
The panel found that Belgium was levying a non-product-related PPM
tax on other countries based on a (foreign) government policy standard. In the
panel's view, the nature of an exporting country's family allowance program
was "irrelevant" to GATT Article I, which does not permit discrimination
dependent on conditions."4 Because Belgium did not claim an Article XX
exception, the case ended with the finding of an Article I violation.
No other Article I cases involving a non-product-related PPM ensued
before the advent of the WTO. In a 1981 decision, a panel considered a
product-related PPM and found that the distinction was not enough to prevent
two similar products from being deemed "like.""' 5 At issue was whether
distinctive methods of cultivation and processing of coffee beans justified
different tariffs for various types of unroasted coffee." 6
The WTO has considered two GATT Article I disputes involving PPMs,
both concerning automobiles. In the Indonesia Automobile case, Japan, the
European Communities, and the United States complained that Indonesia
applied higher customs duties and sales taxes to imported products when the
exporting manufacturer did not utilize a sufficient amount of Indonesian parts
or labor. "' In the Canada Automotive case, Japan and the European
Communities complained that Canada provided an import duty exemption for
an eligible corporation conditioned on its having a manufacturing presence
and sufficient value-added in Canada."8 In both cases, the panels found a
violation of GATT Article I. In neither case did the defendant invoke an
Article XX exception.
111. Id. at 43.
112. Id. at 44-45.
113. Belgian Family Allowances, supra note 108, 3, 6.
114. Id. 3.
115. Spain - Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, June 11, 1981, GATT B.I.S.D. (28th
Supp.) at 102, 112, 4.10 (1982). The panel held that Spain's higher tariffs on "unwashed Arabica" and
Robusta coffee violated GATT Article I because such coffee was a like product to the mild coffee that
could be imported duty free.
116. Id. 4.6.
117. WTO Dispute Panel Report on Indonesia - Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile
Industry, WT/DS54/R (July 2, 1998), available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Indonesia
Automobile Panel Report]. This decision was not appealed.
118. WTO Dispute Panel Report on Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, WT/DS/139/R 10.4 (Feb. 11, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Canada
Automotive Report].
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In the Indonesia Automobile decision, the panel held that according to
GATT Article I, an advantage "cannot be made conditional on any criteria
that is not related to the imported product itself.""1 9 Elaborating on this point,
the panel stated that "[i]n the GATT/WTO, the right of Members cannot be
made dependent upon, conditional on or even affected by, any private
contractual obligations in place."'20 The panel concluded that Indonesia was
levying a PPM tax and tariff based on producer characteristics and domestic
content, and deemed that to be an Article I violation.
In the Canada Automotive decision, the panel held that GATT Article I
was being violated, but adopted a more nuanced interpretation of the Article I
discipline. Specifically, the panel said, "We therefore do not believe that...
Article 1: 1 must be interpreted to mean that making an advantage conditional
on criteria not related to the imported product itself is per se inconsistent with
Article 1: 1, irrespective of whether and how such criteria relate to the origin of
the imported products." '' In other words, the panel suggested that truly origin-
neutral criteria might be permissible under Article I. The panel was careful to
distinguish the holdings in the Belgian Family Allowances and Indonesia
Automobile cases, both of which it viewed as relating to origin-based
discrimination." In the instant case, the panel concluded that the criteria were
not origin-neutral, and so Article I was being violated." On appeal, the
Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding of the Article 1:1 violation but did
not address the panel's interpretive point.
2 4
The Article I caselaw reviewed above can be summarized as follows: A
government policy standard violates MFN because it is origin-contingent. A
producer characteristics standard was held to be a violation in the Indonesia
and Canada automobile cases, but the latter panel suggested that PPMs are not
per se violations of MFN. As this discussion shows, the law of PPMs under
Article I is somewhat unsettled. It is also worth noting that no how-produced
standard has been reviewed under Article I.
C. GATTArticle III- National Treatment Rule
GATT Article I (National Treatment) contains disciplines on domestic
taxation and regulation." Under Article 111:2, imported products shall not be
subject to taxes of any kind in excess of those applied to like domestic
products. Under Article 111:4, imported products shall be accorded treatment
no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin.
119. Indonesia Automobile Panel Report, supra note 117, 14.143.
120. Id. 14.145.
121. Canada Automotive Report, supra note 118, 10.24. See also id. 10.29-30
(elaborating on this point).
122. Id. 10.26, 10.28.
123. Id. 10.50
124. WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada - Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, WT/DS/139/AB/R, 78, 81 (May 31, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org.
125. For exact text, see supra note 98.
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The drafters of Article HI recognized that governments sometimes
utilize processing regulations, and Article 11 does not prohibit that practice.
Article 111:1 provides that internal taxes and regulations affecting the internal
sale, transportation, distribution or use of products, "and internal quantitative
regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified
amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic
products so as to afford protection to domestic production."'26 In stating that
such regulations should not afford protection to domestic production, Article
111:1 implies that mixture or processing regulations that do not afford
protection to domestic production are not prohibited. The same rule can be
inferred from other provisions in Article III that address mixture and
processing. For example, Article 111:5 prohibits mixture/processing
regulations linked to domestic content.'27  Article 111:7 prohibits
mixture/processing regulations that seek to allocate proportions among
external sources of supply.'28 If all mixture/processing regulations were
prohibited, then Article III presumably would not have three prohibitions
aimed at particular kinds of mixture/processing regulations.
Suppose that a government had a regulation prohibiting the sale of a
wood product unless at least eighty percent of its weight came from
sustainably harvested timber of any national origin. That how-produced PPM
would specify a minimum proportion for processing. Written this way, such a
measure would not seem to be a per se violation of Article mII.
Nevertheless, as shown below, adjudicatory panels considering Article
III have objected to PPMs in the few cases where such measures were
reviewed. During the GATT era (1947-94), there were four cases, all against
the United States. Since the advent of the WTO, two cases have arisen, but
other decisions may bear on how Article III would be applied to PPMs.
The earliest GATT case, decided in 1991, is known as the Tuna-Dolphin
I Report.'29 At that time, the United States imposed a "primary" import ban on
tuna from countries that did not have a regulatory regime to protect dolphins
comparable to the U.S. regime.20 Mexico, one of the embargoed countries,
complained that this law violated Article IM.'3' The U.S. import ban was a
government policy standard aimed at foreign laws.'32 Indeed, the law also
contained a fishery-practice standard by requiring Mexico to keep its overall
dolphin killing rate no more than 25 percent higher than the United States'
126. For exact text, see supra note 98.
127. For exact text, see supra note 98.
128. For exact text, see supra note 98.
129. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT, B.I.S.D. (39th
Supp.) at 155 (1991) (not adopted) [hereinafter Tuna Dolphin I Report]; see Henry L. Thaggert, A
CloserLookat the Tuna-Dolphin Case: "Like Products" and "Extrajurisdictionality" in the Trade and
Environment Context, in I TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: THE SEARCH FOR BALANCE 69-95 (James
Cameron et al. eds., 1994).
130. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-711, §4. The
current law contains a different prohibition.
131. Tuna Dolphin I Report, supra note 129, 3.16.
132. Id. 2.5-6.
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annual rate.'33 The panel ruled that Article HI "covers only those measures that
are applied to the product as such." Therefore, the U.S. measure regarding
dolphins did not fit within the confines of Article I because this PPM "could
not possibly affect tuna as a product."'34 The panel went on to say that if the
U.S. measure were covered by Article II, such a measure would constitute a
violation because the United States treatment of Mexico cannot be predicated
on whether or not the incidental taking of dolphins by Mexican vessels
corresponds to that of U.S.-flag vessels.'35 When the matter was debated
before the Council in 1992, the European Commission called for the adoption
of the Tuna-Dolphin report as "a necessary first step in clarifying the
relationship between environmental policies and GATT provisions.' 36
Nevertheless, this judgment was not adopted by the GATT Council and today
carries no legal weight in the WTO.'37
The U.S. Alcoholic Beverages decision came a few months later.'38 This
dispute involved numerous causes of action by Canada, only one of which is
discussed here. Canada complained about an excise tax credit in the State of
Minnesota for small beer breweries, regardless of whether they were domestic
or foreign.'39 Canada argued that this tax measure discriminated against its
large breweries. The panel held that beer from micro-breweries is a like
product to beer from large breweries, and so a tax that distinguishes the two
violates Article III:240 This tax credit is an example of a producer
characteristics PPM.
The second Tuna-Dolphin decision came in 1994 and it too was not
adopted.' The plaintiffs were the European Communities and the Netherlands
acting for the Netherlands Antilles. This panel's Article ]H holding was
133. Id. The U.S. import ban on tuna is not a producer characteristics standard because no
solitary producer can meet it on its own. It is also not a how-produced standard since the import ban is
country-wide. Implicitly, then, the import ban calls on each foreign country to impose a government
policy standard.
134. Id., 5.14. In a recent commentary, Robert Hudec states that the panel's suggestion that
Article IH does not cover process-based regulations "is just plain wrong." Robert E. Hudec, The
Product-Process Doctrine in GATI/WTO Jurisprudence, in NEw DIRECnONS IN INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 187, 198 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000).
135. Tuna Dolphin I Report, supra note 129, 5.15. The panel's overall ruling was that the
United States was imposing a quantitative restriction in violation of GATT Article XI and that therefore
the U.S. trade ban violated GATT rules.
136. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting held on 18-20 February 1992, GATT Doc. C/M254,
March 10, 1992, at 23.
137. The Appellate Body has stated that unadopted GATT or WTO panel reports have no legal
status in the WTO Appellate Body Japanese Alcoholic Beverages Report, supra note 97, at 15.
138. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, March 19, 1992,
GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 206 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. Alcoholic Beverages Report].
139. Id. 5.19. For purposes of its decision, the panel assumed that the Minnesota tax credit
was available to Canadian producers.
140. Id. From the report of the case, the U.S. Trade Representative seems to have made little
effort to defend Minnesota's law and to provide a non-protectionist rationale for it.
141. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 16, 1994, 33 LL.M. 839 (1994)
(not adopted) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin ii Report]. The facts and complaints in the two Tuna-Dolphin
cases were the same, although the second case focused more on the intermediary embargo. Under the
intermediary embargo provisions, the U.S. government was banning tuna imports from countries that
had not stopped buying tuna from countries subject to the U.S. primary embargo. Id. 2.15.
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similar to that of the first Tuna-Dolphin panel. The second panel contended
that Article III did not apply to laws "related to policies or practices that could
not affect the product as such."''
The last pre-WTO decision was U.S. Automobile Taxes, and it too was
not adopted.1 43 The European Communities lodged several complaints, one of
which was that the U.S. Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulation
violated Article 111:4 because it was based on a fleet averaging method that
treated domestic and foreign-made autos separately.'" The panel issued a
broad ruling that "Article I1:4 does not permit treatment of an imported
product less favourable than that accorded to a like domestic product, based
on factors not directly relating to the product as such.' 1 45 Thus, fleet averaging
violated Article III because this method was "based on the ownership or
control relationship of the car manufacturer" and therefore "did not relate to
cars as products."'46 This was a producer characteristics PPM. The panel found
that this Article III violation did not qualify for GATT's environmental
exception, and it therefore held that the CAFE law violated the GATT.1
47
The first WTO panel decision-the U.S. Gasoline case-involved a
producer characteristics PPM regulation for gasoline composition.
4
1
Venezuela and Brazil complained that the U.S. regulation, which required
reduction from a pollution baseline, was discriminatory because it assigned
foreign producers a standard baseline while giving domestic refiners an
individual baseline. 49 The regulation was not based on the chemical
composition of a particular shipment of gasoline, but rather on the entire
output of a domestic refinery or entire output of a foreign refinery that was to
be exported to the United States. The complaining governments argued that
because foreign gasoline was generally higher-polluting, the assignment of a
standard baseline required some of those producers to undertake greater
reductions in polluting ingredients than if they had been given an individual
baseline.15
The U.S. regulation was undoubtedly a violation of the national
treatment rule. Yet in so holding, the U.S. Gasoline panel went farther, issuing
a broad decision that built on the U.S. Alcoholic Beverages and Automobile
Taxes decisions. Noting that the U.S. regulation had been defended on the
ground that data from foreign producers was unverifiable, the panel held that
142. Tuna-Dolphin H Report, supra note 141, 1 5.8.
143. GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Taxes on Automobiles, 33
I.L.M. 1397-1461 (October 11, 1994) (not adopted) [hereinafter U.S. Automobile Taxes Report].
144. Id. 9 3.272. In fleet averaging, the U.S. government sets fuel economy standards based on
the average achieved by a foreign manufacturer for all its autos shipped to the United States. Id. 99 2.14-
15.
145. Id. T 5.54.
146. Id. 5.55.
147. Id.96.1(c).
148. WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Report of the Panel, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter U.S. Gasoline Panel Report].
149. Id. 9 3.12, 6.3.
150. Id. 6.10.
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Article III:4 "does not allow less favorable treatment dependent on the
characteristics of the producer and the nature of the data held by it."'' More
generally, the panel suggested that the identification of like products in Article
III:4 needs to be done "on the objective basis of their likeness as products"
and not according to "extraneous factors" like those in the U.S. Gasoline
dispute.5 2 This Article I1:4 holding was not appealed and was the backbone
of the WTO decision that the U.S. measure violated the GATT.
The second WTO case was Indonesia Automobile. The panel found an
Article 11:2 violation because the tax measures were based on nationality and
origin, and "other factors not related to the product itself."' 53 This was similar
to the panel's ruling on Article .1'
5
4
The third case, Japan Alcoholic Beverages, did not consider a PPM, but
in rejecting the so-called "aim-and-effect" test, its holding makes it more
likely that PPMs will be found to violate GATT Article III.' 55 Aim-and-effect
was a treaty interpretation developed in GATT caselaw and commentary
during the 1990s, which sought to define product likeness more narrowly so
as to prevent Article III from unnecessarily infringing on national regulatory
autonomy. 56 As the U.S. Alcoholic Beverages panel explained in 1992, "once
products are designated as like products, a regulatory product differentiation,
e.g., for standardization or environmental purposes, becomes inconsistent with
Article III even if the regulation is not 'applied... so as [to] afford protection
to domestic production.'1115 7 In other words, if two products I and D are
deemed "like" products, then taxing or regulating them differently, even when
based on an objective environmental distinction,- could be found to violate
Article III if I is taxed more or treated less favorably than D. To avoid such a
holding, the proponents of the "aim-and-effect" test sought to have panels
consider whether the disputed tax or regulation had a protective aim or effect,
151. Id. 6.11.
152. Id. 6.12.
153. Indonesia Automobile Panel Report, supra note 117, 11 14.112-113.
154. See text accompanying supra note 119.
155. See WTO Dispute Panel Report on Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/R,
j 6.17-18 (July 11, 1996), available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Japan Alcoholic Beverages
Panel Report]. The plaintiffs were the United States, the European Community, and Canada. These
governments complained that Japan imposed higher excise taxes on imported liquors, such as vodka and
whisky, than on the domestically produced liquor Shochu. The case centered on whether these were like
products, directly competitive or substitutable products, or neither of these. The panel found that vodka
was a like product and that other imports were directly competitive or substitutable to domestic Shochu.
Because Shochu was taxed less, the panel held that GATT Article I was being violated. The Appellate
Body upheld the panel's reasoning with minor modifications.
156. Robert E. Hudec, GAYT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation: Requiem for an
"Aims and Effects" Test, 32 INT'L L. 619 (1998). One intellectual foundation of this test is discussed in
Frieder Roessler, The Constitutional Function of the Multilateral Trade Order, in ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL
STRUCTURE, FUNCTIONS, & LIMITS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORDER 109, 127-30 (2000). See also Rambod
Behboodi, Legal Reasoning and the International Law of Trade-The First Steps of the Appellate Body
of the WTO, J. WORLD TRADE 55, 87-88 (Aug. 1998) (supporting the decision by the Appellate Body to
clear up the "mess" and dismiss the aim-and-effect test); Aaditya Mattoo & Arvind Subramanian,
Regulatory Autonomy and Multilateral Disciplines: The Dilemma and a Possible Solution, 1 J. INr'L
ECON. L. 303 (1998) (contrasting the textual and contextual approach to ascertaining like products).
157. U.S. Alcoholic Beverages Report, supra note 138, 5.72.
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and, if it did not, then products I and D, treated differently based on the tax or
regulation, could perhaps avoid characterization as like products.
The first time this test was invoked in a WTO proceeding, in the Japan
Alcoholic Beverages dispute, the panel rejected such a test in an Article IH:2
case. "' The Appellate Body upheld the panel and, in a later decision, the
European Communities (EC) Bananas case, the Appellate Body stated its
rejection of "aim-and-effect" explicitly with respect to GATT Article 111: 1.1 1
Although it was not propounded as a way to defend PPMs, the aim-and-
effect test could have provided a doctrinal basis for distinguishing two
otherwise like products that differ only in conformity to the PPM. Without the
aim-and-effect test, a PPM-compliant domestic product may be easily deemed
a "like" product to a PPM-non-compliant imported product. If so, an Article
III violation will occur when government action denies the imported product
an equal opportunity to compete in the domestic market.
The most recent Article III panel decision came in the European
Communities Asbestos case."6 In response to a complaint by Canada, the
panel found that a French import ban on asbestos violated Article I:4
because Canadian asbestos fiber was a "like" product to European substitute
fiber that was permitted." The panel held that the risk to human health or life
from the product could not be a factor in determining whether two products
were "like" under Article III because that would allow a government "to avoid
the obligations in Article XX."'62 This was not a PPM decision since the
French ban was based on the dangers of the product to the user; but if the
decision had been upheld, it would have had negative implications for PPMs.
The Appellate Body reversed on this point, stating that "the health risks
associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of likeness
158. Japan Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report, supra note 155, 9 6.17, 6.23. One stated
reason for rejecting the aim-and-effect test was that if protection of health could be accomplished
without violating Article I, that could "circumvent" Article XX, which requires governments to show
that a health measure is necessary. Id. 6.17. The panel did not explain why a non-violation of Article
HI circumvents Article XX. In its interpretation of GATT Article XX(g) in the U.S. Gasoline case, the
Appellate Body declared that this exception (relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources) "may not be read so expansively as seriously to subvert the purpose and object of Article
HI:4." Appellate Body Gasoline Report, supra note 100, at 17. The Appellate Body did not explain why
Article III should delimit Article XX.
159. Appellate Body Japanese Alcoholic Beverages Report, supra note 97; WTO Appellate
Body Report on European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, 241 (Sept. 9, 1997), available at http://www.wto.org (making clear that the
Appellate Body had rejected this test). But see Howse & Regan, supra note 44, at 266 (suggesting that
the Appellate Body reject a test, but not reject wholesale the consideration of aims and effects in
determining likeness of products).
160. WTO Dispute Panel Report on European Communities - Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos Containing Products, WT/DS135/R (Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter EC Asbestos Panel Report]. The panel held that the French import ban did not violate the
GATT because it qualified for the Article XX(b) exception. The Appellate Body affirmed the panel's
judgment and bverturned the panel's ruling on Article IfI.
161. Id. 8.144,8.150, 8.157, 8.158.
162. Id. 8.130. Canada argued that "[t]he toxicity of a product is not recognized as a criterion
for the evaluation of likeness." Id. 8.118.
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under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.''l6 The Appellate Body said that it
disagreed with the panel's suggestion that recourse to Article Ill could nullify
Article XX." 4 On the contrary, according to the Appellate Body, "Article 111:4
and Article XX(b) are distinct and independent provisions of the GATT 1994
each to be interpreted on its own.""' The Appellate Body went on to say that
the fact that an interpretation of Article I:4 "implies a less frequent recourse
to Article XX(b) does not deprive the exception in Article XX(b) of effet
utile.'
166
The Appellate Body's decision articulates the proper application of
Article I. The Appellate Body points out that even when two products are
deemed "like," there is no violation of Article m:4 unless the imported
product is accorded "less favourable treatment." 67 In other words, a regulator
"may draw distinctions between products which have been found to be 'like,'
without, for this reason alone, according to the group of 'like' imported
products 'less favourable treatment' than that accorded to the group of 'like'
domestic products.' 68 The pivotal point will be whether there is "protection"
of domestic products in the marketplace.' 69 The Appellate Body also makes
clear that a determination of product "likeness" goes beyond the physical
characteristics of the product.7 How this ruling affects PPMs remains to be
seen.
In summary, the textual ambiguities in Article I have been resolved
unfavorably to PPMs. A producer characteristics standard was held to be a
violation of Article I in the U.S. Alcoholic Beverages, U.S. Gasoline, and
Indonesia Automobile decisions. No how-produced standard has been tested,
but WTO jurisprudence points to the likelihood that such a standard would be
deemed a national treatment violation.
A competing view is presented by Robert Howse and Donald Regan,
who cofitend that the text of Article III provides no support for the
product/process distinction or the proposition that Article II prohibits all
163. WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos
and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, 113 (Mar. 12, 2001), available at
http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Appellate Body Asbestos Report); see also id. 192(b) (reversing the
panel finding that a consideration of the health effects of the product was inappropriate). On the larger
dimensions of the case, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision that France's import ban did not
violate GATT rules. Id. 193. For a discussion of the Appellate Body report, see Sydney M. Cone III,
The "Asbestos" Case and Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization: The Uneasy
Relationship Between Panels and the Appellate Body. 23 MICH J. INY'L L. 2 (forthcoming 2002).
164. Appellate Body Asbestos Report, supra note 163, 115.
165. Id.
166. Id. "Effet utile" means useful effect. In maling this point, the Appellate Body seems to
be retreating from its holding in the U.S. Gasoline case that Article XX "may not be read so expansively
as seriously to subvert the purpose and object of Article 1m:4." Appellate Body Gasoline Report, supra
note 100, at 17.
167. Appellate Body Asbestos Report, supra note 163, 100.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. 101-02 (including such criteria as the end-uses of product, consumers' tastes and
habits in respect of the product, and the tariff classification of the products); see also id. 113
(suggesting that the panel evaluate all of the relevant evidence).
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process measures. 7' The authors contrast origin-neutral process measures
(which would include how-produced standards as defined here) with country-
based measures (which would include government policy standards as defined
here) and argue that while Article III prohibits country-based measures, it
does not prohibit origin-neutral measures that distinguish products according
to their production process.' In their view, WTO panels remain free to
enforce Article III to consider the aim and effect of a regulatory PPM in order
to determine the legality of differential treatment of PPM-compliant and non-
compliant products. This Howse and Regan study is flagged here because it
provides a comprehensive analysis of Article III caselaw. Whatever the
validity of their legal analysis, any optimism that future WTO panels will
tolerate origin-neutral PPMs in the context of Article III would be unfounded.
D. GATTArticle XX- General Exceptions
GATT Article XX lists ten exceptions to GATT disciplines.'74 These
exceptions are "[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." This requirement is
now known as the "chapeau" of Article XX. Two of the exceptions would be
available for environmental measures-paragraph (b) for measures "necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health," and paragraph (g) for
measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption." 171 Article XX will be central to an analysis of
PPMs because, as discussed above, many PPMs will violate Articles I, El, or
XI.
The first Article XX case on PPMs was U.S. Automotive Spring
Assemblies in 1983.76 In this case, Canada complained about an import
exclusion order against certain automotive spring assemblies produced in
violation of a valid U.S. patent and without a license from the patent holder.'"
This was a non-product-related how-produced standard. The panel ruled that
171. Howse & Regan, supra note 44, at 252.
172. Id. at 253-72; Marco Bronckers & Natalie McNelis, Rethinking the "Like Product"
Definition in GATT 1994: Anti-Dumping and Environmental Protection, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 38, at 345, 376-77
(suggesting, in a paper predating some recent WTO jurisprudence, that where based on broadly shared
consumer preferences, PPM distinctions might not violate Article Ill); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Precaution,
Participation, and the "Greening" of International Trade Law, 7 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 57, 75 (1992)
(making similar point to that of Howse & Regan in 1992).
173. Howse & Regan, supra note 44, at 264-68.
174. GATT, supra note 3, art. XX.
175. Id. art. XX. For a discussion of the negotiation background of these provisions, see Steve
Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions of GATT Article X, 25 J. WORLD TRADE, Oct.
1991, at 37-47.
176. United States-Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th
Supp.) at 107-28 (1984).
177. Id. 1,6,14.
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the exclusion order met the necessary standard under the Article XX(d)
exception and met the terms of the chapeau.' Therefore, no violation was
found.
In the Tuna-Dolphin cases, the two panels held that the PPM-based
import bans did not qualify for an Article XX exception. Both decisions were
popular among most WTO governments, and both were opposed by the
United States. Neither decision was adopted.
The first Tuna-Dolphin decision (1991) focused on an import ban on
tuna from Mexico. The panel asserted that Article XX(b) did not cover such
an "extrajurisdictional" measure to safeguard dolphins outside the United
States.'79 According to the panel, if Article XX(b) were applied in this way,
the importing government "could unilaterally determine the life or health
protection policies from which other contracting parties could not deviate
without jeopardizing their rights under the General Agreement."'8
The second decision (1994) honed in on the intermediary import ban of
tuna from certain European countries.' This tuna was being barred because
the so-called intermediary governments had not prohibited the importation of
tuna from Mexico (and other primary targets of the U.S. regulation).' As the
U.S. import ban was predicated on the foreign law, it was a government policy
standard. The panel pointed out that tuna imports were prohibited "whether or
not the particular tuna was harvested in a manner that harmed or could harm
dolphins."'8 3 The primary embargo had the same fault, said the panel, and both
types of embargo "were taken so as to force other countries to change their
policies with respect to persons and things within their own jurisdiction."'
The panel then said that Article XX(g) did not permit such a measure because
if it did, "the balance of rights and obligations among contracting parties, in
particular the right of access to markets, would be seriously impaired."'85
Furthermore, in describing the task before it, the panel said that it
had to resolve whether the contracting parties, by agreeing to give each other in Article
XX the right to take trade measures necessary to protect the health and life of plants,
animals and persons or aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural resources, had
agreed to accord each other the right to impose trade embargoes for such purposes.
8 6
The panel assumed that an exporting country has a "right of access" to
the U.S. market, and that this right has independent valence in the
implementation of Article XX. Furthermore, the panel made the assumption
178. Id. 155-56, 59-61. The text of Article XX(d) is provided in supra note 99.
179. Tuna-Dolphin I Report, supra note 129, T 5.27. The panel made a similar ruling
regarding Article XX(g). Id. 5.32.
180. Id. T 5.27 (emphasis added). As some commentators noted at the time, this point was
circular since Mexico's rights to have its tuna accepted by the United States could not be determined
independently of application of Article XX.
181. Tuna-Dolphin H Report, supra note 141, 15.23, 5.36.
182. Id. 5.5.
183. Id. 5.23.
184. Id. 5.24. The panel uses the term "countries" as a synonym for governments.
185. Id. 5.26.
186. Id. 5.42 (emphasis added).
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that in the pre-GATT period, states lacked a right to use trade embargoes for
health and conservation purposes and that the GATT had omitted to accord
such rights to them. The rejoinder is that such rights are inherent to
sovereignty and that the governments writing the GATT did not relinquish
them. As Richard J. McLaughlin has pointed out, with Article XX in the
GATT, governments "have an expectation that they will be able to restrict
trade in order to conserve exhaustible natural resources or to protect the health
of humans, animals, and plants.
'"1 87
The second Tuna-Dolphin panel seemed to be trying to correct the
excesses of the first panel, but the second decision was too ambiguous to
become the new guidepost.' One GATT commentator, Robert Hudec, read
the decision as saying that the U.S. law was a GATT violation because of its
coercive design, but that a rewritten law barring imports of fish caught by
dolphin-unsafe methods could be justified under Article XX.8 9 Other
commentators read the decision as prohibiting PPMs directed at foreign
countries."9
In the U.S. Automobile Taxes case discussed above, the GATT panel
held that the fleet-averaging method could meet the requirements in paragraph
(g) of Article XX. T'9 Fleet averaging violated GATT's national treatment
discipline because the U.S. regulation was dependent on factors not directly
relating to the product. 92 But Article XX(g) does not preclude such factors,
according to the panel.'93 In contrast to this favorable holding, the panel found
that another feature of the U.S. regulation-separate foreign fleet
accounting-prevented the measure from qualifying under Article XX(g).94 In
short, the panel ruled that Article XX could potentially permit a producer
characteristics PPM, but the GATT Council did not adopt this decision.
In the U.S. Gasoline case, the Appellate Body concluded that the U.S.
baseline rule fit within the terms of paragraph (g), but found that the
application of the Gasoline regulation violated the Article XX chapeau.' 95 This
was the first adopted GATT or WTO decision stating that an environmental
PPM could fit within one of the Article XX paragraphs. The measure at issue
187. Richard J. McLaughlin, Sovereignty, Utility, and Fairness: Using US. Takings Law to
Guide the Evolving Utilitarian Balancing Approach to Global Environmental Disputes in the WTO, 78
OR. L. REv. 855, 938 (1999).
188. Cf Patricia Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade
Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1032 (1999).
189. Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against Foreign
Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 95, 119, 151 (Jagdish Bhagwati &
Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
190. See, e.g., William J. Snape II, Searching for GATT's Environmental Miranda.- Are
'Process Standards' Getting 'Due Process?', 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 777, 779-81, 785-86, 814-15
(1994).
191. U.S. Automobile Taxes Report, supra note 143, 5.65-66.
192. See text accompanying supra note 145.
193. Eric Phillips, World Trade and the Environment: The CAFE Case, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L.
827, 850 (1996).
194. U.S. Automobile Taxes Report, supra note 143, 5.49.
195. Appellate Body Gasoline Report, supra note 100, at 13-29.
Law of Environmental "PPMs "
was a producer characteristics PPM.96 The marketability of the gasoline
depended on the foreign or domestic status of the producer and on achieving
reductions from an assigned baseline.' 9
In complying with the WTO decision, the U.S. government changed its
regulation to allow foreign refiners the option of applying for and using an
individual baseline.'98 The ability to sell gasoline is still based on producer
characteristics, but the blatant discrimination against foreign producers was
removed. To assure compliance, foreign refiners had to agree to a set of
enforcement measures including unannounced inspections by U.S. regulators.
Under the new regulation, the ability to sell a particular gallon of gasoline
depends on whether the producer has met its baseline requirements. Thus,
gasoline from one producer could be barred while identical gasoline from
another producer is permitted.
The Shrimp-Turtle case involved an import ban on shrimp from
countries that did not have a turtle-conservation regime comparable to that of
the United States.'99 The U.S. law was complex: it blended a government
policy standard and a review of the actual performance of the foreign
shrimping fleet in safeguarding turtles.7° At the time of the panel proceeding,
the first three of the complaining countries were under a shrimp embargo
linked to a requirement that they enforce comprehensive regulations regarding
the use of turtle excluder devices by their fishing vessels."' Thus, in this
adjudication, the U.S. measure was framed as a government policy standard.
202
The WTO panel held that the import ban could not be justified by
Article XX.23 Specifically, the panel declared that the scope of Article XX did
not extend to measures that condition market access on the adoption of
particular conservation policies by the government seeking access for its
nationals."° The panel was troubled by the fact that the U.S. government was
requiring the plaintiff governments to adopt prescribed policies for all
production, not just for exports to the United States."5 The panel found this
situation unacceptable because if the United States did this, so could other
196. See supra note 149. It should be noted that none of the parties to the dispute characterized
this measure as a PPM.
197. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
198. Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Baseline Requirements for Gasoline Produced
by Foreign Refiners, 62 Fed. Reg. 45,533 (Aug. 28, 1997). This rule was challenged in U.S. court for
several reasons, one of which was that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency should not have
considered U.S. obligations under the WTO in administering the statute. The court upheld the Agency's
statutory interpretation and the regulation. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
199. United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the
Panel, WT/DS58/R (May 15, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report]. All four of the plaintiff
countries had turtle conservation regimes in place. Indeed, two of them (India and Pakistan) had
imposed unilateral trade bans on endangered sea turtles before the adoption in 1973 of the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). Id. 3.4, 3.11.
200. Pub. L. 101-162 § 609(b)(1), (b)(2), 103 Stat. 1038.
201. Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 199, 2.16.
202. Id. 7.6. The panel noted, however, that the U.S. import ban did not apply to shrimp
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countries, and if these unilateral requirements were inconsistent, "it would be
impossible for exporting Members to comply at the same time with multiple
conflicting policy requirements.""2 6 The panel contrasted such a regulation
with a ban on the import of products made by prison labor.2 1 Such a how-
produced standard applies only to the products of such labor, not to the
exporting country's policy on prison labor.2° In summarizing its overall
holding, the panel explained that it did "not imply that recourse to unilateral
measures is always excluded, particularly after serious attempts have been
made to negotiate"2"
The Appellate Body upheld the panel's conclusion that the U.S. import
ban violated the GATT, but put forward a different reason than the panel.21
The Appellate Body found that the import ban did fit within the scope of
Article XX and was provisionally justified by XX(g).2" Specifically, the
Appellate Body stated that the "means and ends relationship" of banning
shrimp imports and protecting turtles was "close and real," and the trade
measure used was "not disproportionately wide in its scope and reach. ' 12
Nevertheless, the U.S. measure was flawed, the Appellate Body said, because
the measure as applied failed to meet the requirements of the Article XX
chapeau.213 One major flaw was that the U.S. certification process "does not
allow for any inquiry into the appropriateness of the regulatory program for
the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries." '14 Other flaws included
inflexibility in administrative determinations and lack of opportunity for the
embargoed government to appeal."'
To restate the holding, the Appellate Body said that it is not necessarily
a GATT violation to impose a government policy PPM on exporting countries
but that in doing so the regulator must be sensitive to the conditions in each
country, and the administrative process must meet minimum standards of
transparency and procedural fairness. This result does not conflict with the
GATT Belgian Family Allowances judgment, which was not an Article XX
206. Id. The panel's important point deserves more attention. Suppose that Country A forbids
the importation of shrimp from countries that do not require the use of a Turtle Excluder Device (TED)
while Country B forbids the importation of shrimp from countries that do not require the use of a Turtle
Untrapping Device (TUD). In that hypothetical, no economic actors in Country E would be able to sell
simultaneously to buyers in Countries A and B. One can make the hypothetical more troublesome by
assuming that A is the leading producer of TEDs and B the leading producer of TUDs.
207. Id. 7.45 n.649.
208. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2001) (banning the importation of convict-made goods).
209. Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 199, 9 7.61; see also id. 9 7.56 (noting the
possibility that unilateral PPMs would be WTO consistent); David D. Caron & Hans Rudolf Triieb,
Protecting Trade and Turtles: The WTO and the Coherency of International Law, TRANSLEX, Dec.
1998, at 3.
210. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15.
211. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 121, 141, 145, 149. The
Appellate Body found that the U.S. measure was made effective in conjunction with a restriction on
domestic production (harvesting) of shrimp-that is, the domestic PPM and imported-product PPM
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case. But the new ruling shows a sophisticated consideration of discrimination
not present in the Family Allowances decision.
The Appellate Body also criticized the United States for not being more
cooperative. It noted that the United States was not a party to the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea or to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, and thus was not making use of existing international cooperative
mechanisms." Furthermore, according to the Appellate Body, the U.S.
government had not made serious efforts to negotiate a treaty with affected
countries before imposing the import embargo.217 The Appellate Body
characterized this behavior as unjustified discrimination because the U.S.
government had negotiated successfully with other countries seeking to export
shrimp to the United States."
Although the Appellate Body did not say that PPMs are legal under the
GATT, the inferences in the decision imply the legality of PPMs. 9 The first-
level panel had asserted that a shrimp-turtle style of PPM fell outside the
scope of Article XX, and the Appellate Body reversed that conclusion. Then
the Appellate Body found that the import ban fit paragraph (g), yet failed to
comply with the chapeau. Had the Appellate Body believed that the GATT
prohibits all non-product-related PPMs, then it could have so stated. The fact
that the Appellate Body reviewed the PPM carefully2 and gave specific
criticisms of how the U.S. government was applying the law demonstrates that
PPMs can be justified under Article XX. When the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body adopted the Appellate Body report, the delegate from Pakistan (one of
the plaintiff governments) recognized the significance of the decision, and
stated that, "Effectively, the Appellate Body's decision permitted Members to
discriminate against products based on non-product related PPMs.'
In complying with the WTO decision, the U.S. Department of State
revised its regulation to accord more due process and provide more flexibility
216. Id. 171.
217. Id. 166, 171. The U.S. government explained that it attempted to negotiate with the
complainant countries after the U.S. court ordered the embargo, but those countries did not respond.
Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 199, 7.54,7.56.
218. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 167, 172, 176.
219. Id. 121 (stating that it should not be assumed that a measure is incapable ofjustification
under Article XX when the measure requires exporting countries to comply with or adopt specified
policies); see Arthur E. Appleton, Shrimp/Turtle: Untangling the Nets, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 477, 492
(1999) (stating that under the ruling, measures based on non-product-related PPMs can satisfy Article
XX(g)); Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GAIT: Environmental Trade Measures and the Shrimp-
Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 31, 38 (2000) (stating that consistent with the plain language of Article
XX, the Appellate Body's opinion allows for import bans designed to change the policies of other
governments); Petros C. Mavroidis, Trade and Environment after the "Shrimps-Turtles" Litigation, 34
. WORLD TRADE, Feb. 2000, at 73, 87 (2000) (stating that unilateral environmental measures are not
WTO inconsistent); Scott C. Owen, Might A Future Tuna Embargo Withstand A WYTO Challenge in
Light of the Recent Shrimp-Turtle Ruling?, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 123 (2000) (concluding that it might
withstand WTO challenge).
220. According to the Appellate Body, the Article XX chapeau has to be applied "as the kind
and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ." Appellate
Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 159.
221. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting, WT/DSBM/50, at 5 (Dec. 14, 1998),
available at http://www.wto.org.
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to foreign governments and to permit shrimp imports so long as the shrimp are
harvested under conditions that do not adversely affect sea turtles. 2 Thus, it
became possible under the new regulations for U.S. imports to acquire shrimp
from countries that had not received a country-wide certification under the
government policy standard. 3 In effect, this provision carved out a how-
produced standard as an alternative to the government policy standard
prescribed in U.S. law.
In 2000, the Government of Malaysia complained that the new U.S.
regulation did not correct the WTO violation; however, in June 2001 the panel
ruled in favor of the United States. 4 The panel articulated its standard of
review to be whether the U.S. government made "serious good faith efforts to
negotiate an international agreement, taking into account the situations of the
other negotiating countries." '225 The panel concluded that the government had
made such efforts, and did not analyze the quality of Malaysia's efforts to
reach agreement with the United States. In addition, the panel opined that the
U.S. trade measures would "be accepted under Article XX if they were
allowed under an international agreement," but in the absence of such
agreement, such measures are "more to be seen, for the purposes of Article
XX, as the possibility to adopt a provisional measure allowed for emergency
reasons than as a definitive 'right' to take a permanent measure."6 Then,
building on its new concept of a "provisional" measure, the panel declared
that the presence of U.S. compliance "may be reassessed at any time." 7
Malaysia appealed certain elements of the panel's ruling, but the
Appellate Body upheld the panel, finding that the United States was in
compliance.22 The Appellate Body agreed with the panel that the U.S. trade
222. Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162
Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946,
36,949 (July 8, 1999). The regulation stated that the U.S. government would not impose an import ban
on shrimp harvested by commercial vessels using turtle excluder devices comparable in effectiveness to
those required by the United States.
223. WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WTIDS58/RW, 5.107 & n.232, 5.108 (June
15, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org, [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle Article 21.5 Panel Report]
(noting that U.S. officials had permitted specific shipments of shrimp from Brazil under this provision).
The U.S. Court of International Trade has declared this aspect of the regulation to be a violation of U.S.
law, but the Court did not enjoin U.S. officials from continuing to provide this flexibility. See Earth
Island Institute v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d. 1064 (1999).
224. Shrimp-Turtle Article 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 223, 153. Article 21.5 is the
provision in the DSU that provides for a review as to whether the defendant government has taken
measures to comply with an adverse WTO panel report. See DSU, supra note 75, art. 21.5.
225. Shrimp-Turtle Article 21.5 Panel Report, supra note 223, 5.73.
226. Id. 5.88. The panel's report manifested some discomfort with this finding of U.S.
compliance. The panel suggested that if Malaysia sought to export shrimp to the United States,
[I]t would be subject to requirements that may distort Malaysia's priorities in terms of
environmental policy. As Article XX of the GATT 1994 has been interpreted by the
Appellate Body, the WTO Agreement does not provide for any recourse in the situation
Malaysia would face under those circumstances.
Id. 5.103. The panel then said that the Appellate Body's ruling prevented the panel from finding in
favor of Malaysia "on this 'sovereignty' issue...." Id.
227. Id. 5.88, 6.1 (b), 6.2. Thus, the United States seems to be under a probationary status.
228. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 by Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, 96 (Oct. 22, 2001),
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measure was justified by Article XX so long as the conditions stated in the
panel report continued to be satisfied---"in particular the ongoing serious,
good faith efforts to reach a multilateral agreement."' 9 The Appellate Body
also agreed that the new U.S. regulation provided sufficient flexibility to
foreign governments, and further stated that Article XX does not require an
importing government "to anticipate and provide explicitly for the specific
conditions prevailing and evolving in every individual [WTO] Member."" °
The Appellate Body decision was handed down as this Article was being
prepared for publication, and confirms the thesis herein that PPMs do not
violate WTO rules. This decision marks the first time that an environmental
PPM was declared WTO-compliant. In making its initial decision in Shrimp-
Turtle in 1998, the Appellate Body assumed, for purposes of its analysis, that
the turtles involved traversed U.S. waters." The issue of what WTO rules
dictate concerning PPMs aimed at achieving ecological objectives in the
global commons was not reached in this decision. It will take an affirmative
judgment in a dispute involving such "extrajurisdictional" conservation to
exorcize the demons in the first Tuna-Dolphin decision that so shocked
environmentalists in 1991.
The EC Asbestos case does not involve a PPM, but it was the first ruling
by a WTO panel that an import measure could be justified by Article XX(b).
In applying this exception, the panel held that a health measure could be
deemed "necessary" under this provision if there were no other measures
consistent (or less inconsistent) with the GATT that could achieve the
defendant government's health policy objectives 32
The next development in Article XX jurisprudence occurred in the
Korea Beef case. 3 The Australian and U.S. governments complained about a
Korean government requirement that foreign beef be segregated and sold
separately in Korea.23 The WTO panel found this regulation to be a violation
of GATT Article I1:4. Reviewing Korea's regulation under Article XX(d),
the panel concluded that the dual retail system was a "disproportionate
measure not necessary to secure compliance with the Korean law against
deceptive practices," and therefore "not justified by Article XX(d) of
GATT." 6 Thus, the panel found Korea to be in violation of WTO rules.
available at http://www.wto.org. Australia, India, and Thailand supported Malaysia's position that the
U.S. import ban violated WTO rules. Id. 46, 50, 64, 74.
229. Id. T 152.
230. Id. 149.
231. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 133.
232. EC Asbestos Panel Report, supra note 160, 8.173, 8.179, 8.183, 8.199, 8.204, 8.206.
Furthermore, the panel suggests that each government can determine what level of risk it wants to
assume. Id. T 8.175 n.119.
233. WTO Appellate Body Report on Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org
[hereinafter Appellate Body Korea Beef Report].
234. WTO Dispute Panel Report on Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and
Frozen Beef, WT/DSl61/R, WT/DS169/R, 511 (July 31.2000), available at http://www.wto.org.
235. Id. 639, 643, 692.
236. Id. 9675.
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This was not a PPM case, but the Appellate Body's decision has
implications for PPM jurisprudence. The Appellate Body upheld the
judgment, and established a new balancing interpretation of Article XX(d). 7
Noting that Article XX(d) requires that measures be "necessary," the
Appellate Body held that determining such necessity "involves in every case a
process of weighing and balancing a series of factors, which prominently
include the contribution made by the compliance measure to the enforcement
of the law or regulation at issue, the importance of the common interests or
values protected by that law or regulation, and the accompanying impact of
the law or regulation on imports or exports.""8
The Appellate Body cited this Article XX(d) holding in its later decision
in the Asbestos appealY 9 In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body upheld the
panel's finding that the disputed measure qualified for the Article XX(b)
exception.24 In reaching that decision, the Appellate Body considered
"whether there is an alternative measure that would achieve the same end and
that is less restrictive of trade than a prohibition."24' The Appellate Body then
examined Canada's proposed alternative and concluded that it would not
achieve the same end (that is, the same chosen level of health protection) as
the regulatory measure being used by France.242 This decision is noteworthy
because the Appellate Body incorporated a less-trade-restrictive test into
GATT Article XX(b). No previous GATT or WTO panel had done so."' This
establishes a new hurdle for governments using an Article XX(b) defense.
In summary, the Article XX exceptions apply to PPMs.2" An
examination of the GATT and WTO caselaw contradicts the views expressed
at the beginning of Part III, all of which came after the Appellate Body
decision in the first phase of the Shrimp-Turtle dispute. No adopted GATT or
WTO decision has suggested that PPMs are outside the scope of Article XX. 45
The decisions in the U.S. Gasoline and Shrimp-Turtle cases against
237. Appellate Body Korea Beef Report, supra note 233, 164, 186(f).
238. Id. 164.
239. Appellate Body Asbestos Report, supra note 163, 9 172.
240. Id. 9 192(f).
241. Id. 172.
242. Id. 9 173-74.
243. For a review of the caselaw, see Axel Desmedt, Proportionality in WTO Law, 4 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 441, 460, 462-73 (2001). This test was used in one GATT case regarding Article XX(d) and
then resurfaced in the Korea Beef case. Desmedt's article does not draw the conclusion that a less-or-
least-trade-restrictive test is a new development in Article XX(b). His Article discusses the development
of a proportionality principle in GATTI/WTO jurisprudence. In the Shrimp-Turtle compliance decision,
the panel suggested that the Appellate Body's Shrimp-Turtle decision of 1998 implied a trade
restrictiveness comparison regarding Article XX(g). Shrimp-Turtle Article 21.5 Panel Report, supra
note 223, 99 5.51, 5.58, 5.67.
244. Frank Biermann, The Rising Tide of Green Unilateralism in World Trade Law, Potsdam
Inst. for Climate Impact Res., PIK REPORT No. 66, at 17 (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.pik-
potsdam.de; Sandeep K. Tetarwal & Pradeep Mehta, Process and Production Methods (PPMs)-
Implications for Developing Countries, CUTS BRIEFING PAPER No. 7, at 1 (Consumer Unity & Trade
Soc'y 2000).
245. Cf Jagdish Bhagwati, After Seattle: Free Trade and the WTO, 77 INT'L AFF. 15, 28
(2001) ("1 was astounded that the Appellate Court in effect reversed longstanding jurisprudence on PPM
(process and production method) in the shrimp-turtle case.!).
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environmental measures did not turn on their PPM status. Although the
Shrimp-Turtle panel criticized the coerciveness of a government policy
standard, the Appellate Body did not perceive the use of PPMs as legally fatal.
None of the GATT/WTO environmental cases has involved a how-produced
standard.
As noted above, the Appellate Body has endorsed balancing to some
extent in two recent Article XX decisions. This new development is troubling
because the WTO has no institutional competence for weighing
incommensurate values, such as the exporting interests of one country against
the environmental interests of another.246 A few years ago, Thomas
Schoenbaum observed that
[E]nforcement of PPMs in other countries could be encouraged by replacing the current
legal tests with a more lenient test that would allow WTO dispute settlement panels to
balance the legitimacy of the protected environmental value with the disruption to trading
interests. This proposal, which is derived from the way the United States Supreme Court
decides Commerce Clause cases, seems unsuited to international tribunals like WTO




Leaving aside the questionable proposition that balancing will be a
"more lenient" approach to PPMs, Schoenbaum is right that such balancing is
unsuited for dispute resolution under the trading system. Balancing is
inappropriate because there is no way for a panel to objectively weigh
incommensurate concerns, such as the value of commercial freedom versus
the value of environmental protection, where the litigant governments will
likely have different metrics for these values. The problem is not just that
balancing by trade experts will tend to value trade more than environment.
Rather, the problem is one of legitimacy. WTO governments show no
willingness to delegate basic policy judgments to independent panels.
E. Restatement of the Law
For environmental PPMs, the most important WTO law is found in
GATT Article XX and can be restated as follows: The WTO/GATT does not
prohibit environmental PPMs as such. PPM-based import bans may be
inconsistent with GATT Articles I, lI, or XI, yet if undertaken for an
environmental purpose, such measures still may qualify for an Article XX
exception. Both the government policy standard and the producer
characteristics standard are potentially justifiable under Article XX, but both
standards will receive scrutiny as to procedural fairness and environmental
246. For example, suppose that the United States bans all shrimp from Malaysia because of
one turtle death there. A reasonable person might say that the U.S. action values turtles over trade. On
the other hand, suppose that Malaysia refuses to spend $30,000 to save hundreds of turtles. A reasonable
person might say that Malaysia overvalues exports over turtles. These would be easy cases for a WTO
panel engaged in balancing, but one can imagine more difficult ones. By what metric is the WTO panel
supposed to make such judgments?
247. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The
Continuing Searchfor Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 291 (1997) (citations omitted).
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justification. A how-produced standard might be subject to less scrutiny
because its means are more clearly related to its policy ends.
In its first two Article XX environmental decisions (U.S. Gasoline and
Shrimp-Turtle), the Appellate Body breathed life into the Article XX chapeau,
which can serve as a bulwark against unfair and protectionist measures."5 By
contrast, the chapeau played no part in the Tuna-Dolphin reports. The rigorous
chapeau review in Shrimp-Turtle may develop as a key foundation of the new
law of PPMs.
F. Broader Implications
This Article has focused on environmental PPMs, but the question arises
whether the same conclusion-that the WTO does not prohibit environmental
PPMs-applies to other kinds of PPMs. For example, what would be the legal
status of an import ban on apparel made by exploited children, or on fur from
a country that permits leg-hold traps, or on pharmaceuticals tested on
animals?249 For such issues, no authoritative answer exists as of yet. In
Shrimp-Turtle, the Appellate Body saw a "nexus" between the locus of the
environmentally-harmful shrimping and the U.S. interest in conserving
migratory sea turtles.50 Such a nexus should be easy to find where the dispute
involves an ecosystem shared by the litigant countries. But for social or moral
issues, the required nexus may not exist. Furthermore, the Appellate Body
found that the U.S. trade measure on shrimp was "reasonably related to the
ends" of conserving an endangered species. 5' Non-environmental PPMs
would be subject to analogous scrutiny as to whether the means relate
reasonably to the ends. The Appellate Body also stated that the "actual
contours and contents" of the Article XX chapeau will vary "as the kind of
measure under examination varies." 252
It should also be noted that PPMs address only one part of the product
cycle, and the legal conclusions presented here might not be applicable to
regulations that extend beyond production. Importation can be made
contingent on a variety of post-production practices. For example, goods that
are stolen, mislabeled, or packaged in certain ways might be stopped at the
border. Similarly, importation can be contingent on how a product is to be
used or what disposal methods are readily available. 3 Importation can also be
248. Appellate Body*Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 160 (noting that the chapeau
projects both substantive and procedural requirements); Chang, supra note 17, at 2172, 2208 (noting that
the Article XX chapeau contains clauses designed to prevent abuse of the exceptions).
249. See, e.g., ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS, WTO-FoOD
FOR THOUGHT-FARM ANIMAL WELFARE AND THE WTO (1999); Adelle Blackett, Whither Social
Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and Treaty Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 1
(1999). In November 2000, the U.S. government banned clothing imports from a factory in Mongolia
after finding that the factory employed underage children on long shifts. Joseph Kahn, Citing Child
Labor, U.S. Bans Apparel From Mongolia Plant, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 29,2000, at C6.
250. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 133.
251. Id. 141.
252. Id. 120.
253. For example, in the United States, there is a high tariff on hand-woven wool fabrics, but
this tariff is omitted when such fabrics are to be used or sold by a religious institution. United States
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contingent on whether exportation is legal in the country of export. 4 Note that
the common feature in all of these requirements is that two otherwise like
products are treated differently.
Although this Article addresses only regulations imposed on imports,
many of the same legal issues arise in export restrictions. For instance, the
U.S. government is a prodigious user of technology-export controls that treat
like products differently depending upon how the product is to be used, who
the end user is, and where the end use will beY5 Unilateral controls that
involve military equipment may be justified by GATT Article XXI (security
exceptions), which provides an exception for traffic in "goods and materials as
is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military
establishment." 6 The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
provides a good example of an export restriction linked to where a product is
to be used. The Energy Chapter states that NAFTA parties may, in exporting
an energy product or a petrochemical good to a party, require that the energy
product be consumed in that party's territory rather than be re-exported to
another country. 7
To summarize, Part III explicates the WTO law of PPMs and
demonstrates the falsity of the myth that PPMs are illegal under the WTO.
This is a significant finding since, as Part I explains, PPMs are sometimes
needed for environmental policymaking. The last part of the Article will
discuss how a better appreciation of WTO law can help governments make
progress in resolving tensions between trade and environmental interests.
IV. DEBUNKING THE MYTH AND MOVING FoRwARD
The argument that environmental PPMs violate the WTO has not had its
intended effect. Rather than inhibiting PPMs, it has prevented a reasoned
discourse about how to distinguish appropriate from inappropriate PPMs.
Little is being done to deal with the root causes of such trade restrictions.
When negotiators do not share a common legal understanding about the
subject of a negotiation, a successful resolution will be difficult to achieve. It
is hard to bargain in the shadow of the law when governments have sharply
divergent views on what the law is. Because the governments most opposed to
PPMs believe (incorrectly) that they are illegal, they have adopted an
implacable and adversarial stance toward PPMs that has undermined any
resolution of the conflict.
International Trade Commission, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, subheading
9810.00.20, available at http:lldataweb.usitc.govlSCRIPTS/tariff/toc.htnl (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
254. For example, U.S. law bans the import of fish or wildlife transported or sold in violation
of any foreign law. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a)(2)(A) (1994).
255. See generally COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS (Evan P. Berlack & Cecil Hunt eds.,
2000).
256. GATT art. XXI(b)(ii), supra note 3.
257. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 603.3(b), 32 I.L.M. 289, 365
(1993) (applying when a party maintains a restriction on exportation of an energy product to a non-
party).
2002)
104 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 27: 59
But it is not just opponents of PPMs who are victims of the myth that
PPMs are illegal. Some of the people who recognize the need for PPMs are
also confused about WTO law. Therefore, these individuals and groups tend
to frame their proposals as amending the WTO to permit certain kinds of
PPMs.255 Yet because WTO decisionmaking is consensual, such action will be
impossible, and the lack of movement at the WTO reinforces the perception
that "trade and environment" issues are irresolvable. 259
The continuing debate about the status of PPMs erodes support for the
WTO. Developing country officials, who may believe the myth that the WTO
prohibits PPMs, perceive the continued use of PPMs by the United States as
proof that the WTO remains power-based rather than rule-based. 21°
Conversely, proponents of environmental PPMs worry that the WTO will
attack such measures.26" ' This has detrimental effects for the trading system,
since alienated environmentalists will undermine public support for the WTO.
Moreover, the schism between environmentalists and the trading system is
also bad for environmental policy. Until the status of PPMs is properly
understood, many environmentalists are not going to pay much attention to the
ways in which WTO rules and trade itself can promote opportunities for better
environmental policy. Therefore, win-win opportunities are being missed.262
If stakeholders shared a common understanding of the WTO law of
PPMs, it might be possible to begin to bridge the gap between commerce and
conservation. The proponents of PPMs should admit that they sometimes
impose disproportionate costs on particular countries, and the opponents
should admit that PPMs sometimes generate global benefits. When a foreign
practice has an adverse environmental impact at home, the WTO should not
demand that citizen-consumers accept foreign products of that process in the
interest of promoting greater trade. What the WTO can do, however, is to
erect effective disciplines for assuring that PPMs have an environmental
justification and are applied in a justifiable manner.263 The next two sections
make suggestions for disciplining and managing PPMs. Disciplines are
258. Aaron Cosbey, Institutional Challenges and Opportunities in Environmentally Sound
Trade Expansion: A Review of the Global State of Affairs, in NoRTH-SOUTH AGENDA PAPERS No. 41, at
3-5 (North-South Ctr. 2000), available at http://www.miami.edu/nse (proposing a new WTO agreement
to address PPMs and environmental treaties); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and
U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 65-66 (2001) (noting that the trade law decisions
regarding tuna, shrimp, and bananas have increased pressure from industrial countries, and particularly
from labor and environmental groups, to loosen GATT restrictions in order to accommodate domestic
legislation promoting valid public policy concerns).
259. See WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. IX:1 (decisionmaking by consensus); Malaysia
Against Any Move to Amend Existing GA7T/WTO, XINHtA ENGLISH NEwSwIRE, June 9, 1998, LEXIS
NEXIS Library Newsgroup file (discussing the use of trade measures to address environmental
problems).
260. Based on the reaction of government delegates to the WTO during the author's lecture on
the topic presented in this Article in October 2000.
261. See PETER FUGAZZOTTO & TODD STEINER, SLAIN BY TRADE: THE ATTACK OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION ON SEA TURTLES AND THE US ENDANGERED SPECIES AcT (1998).
262. SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 50-53 (discussing win-win scenarios).
263. Figueres Olsen, Salazar-Xirinachs & Araya, supra note 91, at 175 (stating that a creative
approach would be an international system that identifies the appropriate baseline standards and
punishes unfair PPM-based discrimination).
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needed to screen out improper PPMs that are unfair to exporting countries,
particularly developing countries. Better global management is needed to
resolve the transborder problems that give rise to PPMs.
A. Disciplining PPMs
Disciplines are needed against ill-conceived environmental PPMs
applied to imports. International rules should strongly discourage PPMs that
prescribe inappropriate policies for foreign countries, or those that are
implemented unfairly. Much of what ought to be done lies within the
competence of the trade regime. But complementary action in other regimes
will also be required.
Although many commentators claim that the key distinction is that of
multilateral versus unilateral PPMs, the reality is more complex, with many
different shades of multilateralism. A treaty can require a PPM-for example,
the Montreal Protocol on Ozone forbids the importation of controlled
substances from States that are not party to the Protocol (or have not agreed to
be bound by it).2" A treaty can authorize a PPM-for example, the Wellington
Convention on Driftnets states that each Party may take measures consistent
with international law to prohibit the importation of fish caught using a
driftnet.261 A treaty can authorize trade measures in response to actions that
undermine the treaty-for example, the Anadromous Stocks Convention
directs the Parties to take appropriate measures to prevent trafficking in
anadromous fish taken in violation of the Convention.26 6 Furthermore, the
Commission administering an environmental treaty can authorize non-
product-related PPMs. For example, on several occasions the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas has recommended that
Parties take "non-discriminatory trade restrictive measures" on specified
fishery products from listed countries that are adjudged to be violating the
Convention.267 While all of these examples might be called multilateral, they
are also unilateral (except for the Montreal Protocol) because the PPM-using
country is encouraged but not required to use the trade measure. Moreover,
under some of the treaties, the trade action is (or can be) directed at non-
parties, so it is not consensually based.
Despite these complexities, the degree of multilateral approval for the
PPM ought to be a factor in evaluating its appropriateness. If several countries
are applying the PPM, then it is much less likely to be protectionist or
arbitrary. This factor can also be expressed as multilateral disapproval. A
264. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 62, arts. 4.1,
4.9. This is a government policy standard.
265. Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific, Nov.
24, 1989, 29 I.L.M 1454, art. 3(2). This is a how-produced standard.
266. Convention for the Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean, Feb.
11, 1992, U.S. Senate Treaty Doc. 102-30, art. 111:3, available at http://www.npafc.org.
267. See, e.g., Resolution by ICCAT Concerning an Action Plan to Ensure Effectiveness of the
Conservation Program for Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, transmitted Jan. 23, 1995, available at
http://www.iccat.org.
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treaty can admonish against a unilateral trade ban or even preempt it.26 For
example, the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation
of Sea Turtles directs parties to act in accordance with GATT Article XI with
respect to the subject matter of the Convention. 6 9 This seems to imply no
import bans since Article XX is not mentioned.
When unilateral PPMs are under review, GATT Article XX will often be
the decisive law. If product Y is banned to safeguard a resource Z, the WTO
will need to analyze the facts underlying the relationship between Y and Z.
For instance, in the Shrimp-Turtle case, the Appellate Body considered
shrimping regulation, turtle conservation, and how shrimping affected
turtles.
270
To scrutinize PPMs, the WTO will assess the validity of the
environmental purpose underlying the trade measure. This may proceed with
some deference, however. As the Appellate Body pointed out in the U.S.
Gasoline case, WTO Member governments retain "a large measure of
autonomy to determine their own policies on the environment."27' The
Appellate Body also stated that Article XX decisions need to be made on a
case-by-case basis.272
In judging PPMs, the WTO should not tolerate an economic motivation
for imposing a PPM on imports. 3 For example, it is one thing for the United
States to demand that the shrimp it imports be caught in a turtle-safe way so as
to safeguard turtles. Yet it is an entirely different matter to seek to "level the
playing field" by insisting that foreign producers use the same production
practice as U.S. shrimpers so as to offset any regulatory cost differences
between domestic and foreign producers. This latter motivation should not be
shielded by GATT Article XX.274
The WTO should discourage the most troublesome types of PPM. The
government policy standard should be disfavored because it is coercive and
abides origin-based discrimination.7 5 The producer characteristics standard
268. See Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and the
Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the
United States Dormant Commerce Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-
DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAw, supra note 38, at 139, 151.
269. Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles, supra
note 59, art. XV:2; Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 170.
270. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, 135, 138, 140-41, 186.
271. Appellate Body Gasoline Report, supra note 100, at 30.
272. Id. at 18.
273. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Effective Pollution Control in Industrialized Countries:
International Economic Disincentives, Policy Responses, and the GATT, 70 MICH. L. REv. 859, 901-02
(1972).
274. See Jagdish Bhagwati & T.N. Srinivasan, Trade and the Environment: Does
Environmental Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade?, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION
159-99 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996).
275. It is interesting to note that the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing commits
governments to take action against transshipment of goods from the country of origin through another
country. In particular, the Agreement authorizes the use of import restraints against foreign countries
"where there is evidence of the involvement of the territories of the Members through which the goods
have been transshipped." Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, supra note 71, art. 5.4. Such an import
restraint would be a government policy PPM because the import ban would be linked to whether the
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should be disfavored because such a standard is too easy to tilt against foreign
producers. Thus, if a unilateral PPM is to be used, it should be crafted as a
how-produced standard that can be aimed directly at the odious production
practice. When possible, the standard should be expressed flexibly in terms of
performance rather than design. 6 In other words, rather than specifying a type
of turtle-excluder device, the importing government might set a maximum
tolerance for incidental turtle deaths during shrimping. This could be policed
by observers and product certifications.
In calling for a disfavoring of the government policy standard, this
Article is not calling for it to be outlawed. There may be circumstances when
a how-produced standard is impractical. For example, when raw materials are
co-mingled in production, there may be no way to enforce a how-produced
PPM. A how-produced standard may also prove to be unsuccessful. One can
easily imagine a scenario where the how-produced standard does not prevent
the environmental damage but instead only reallocates the product to different
markets.2" For example, in a dispute like Shrimp-Turtle, the turtle-safe shrimp
could be shipped to countries that insist on it while the more haphazardly-
caught shrimp is shipped elsewhere (perhaps at a lower price).
In addition to examining the PPM itself, the WTO should also examine
why it is invoked and how it is applied. The first Appellate Body decision in
the Shrimp-Turtle case lays down helpful markers for steps that should be
taken to pursue multilateral cooperation and to accord due process to the
exporting country.278 Some commentators have been critical of these points,
particularly as they relate to international negotiations. For example,
Lakshman Guruswamy contends that the Shrimp-Turtle decision "constitutes
a violation of the principle of state sovereignty by attempting to second-guess
the manner in which the United States should have conducted treaty
negotiations. '279 Virginia Dailey argues that the language of Article XX should
not be interpreted to require governments to attempt to negotiate a treaty as a
precondition for using a trade measure.280 John 0. McGinnis and Mark L.
Movsesian argue that the WTO should not establish a duty to negotiate
because that "would require the Appellate Body to make sensitive judgments
about the desirability of various regulatory options and thereby inexorably
move it toward shaping international standards. '28' These commentators are
exporting government has a policy of prohibiting transshipment.
276. See TBT Agreement, supra note 12, art. 2.8 (directing governments to use performance
rather than design-based regulations wherever appropriate). In October 2001, the Government of New
Zealand proposed a set of"Environment and Trade Principles" for the forthcoming WTO Ministerial in
Doha. One principle is that governments should "seek standards that focus on the environmental
objective which is being promoted, rather than seek to prescribe unnecessarily the method by which the
objective should be reached." Press Release, The Honorable Jim Sutton, Government Issues New Trade
and Environment Framework (Oct. 25, 2001), available at http://www.executive.govt.nz.
277. Chang, supra note 17, at 2179.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 214-218.
279. Lakshman Guruswamy, The Annihilation of Sea Turtles: World Trade Organization
Intransigence and U.S. Equivocation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,261, 10,267 (2000).
280. Virginia Dailey, Sustainable Development: Reevaluating the Trade vs. Turtles Conflict at
the WTO, 9 J. TRANSNAT'LL. &POL'Y 331, 377 (2000).
281. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARv. L.
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right to flag this issue, but their conclusions may be going too far. Prior efforts
to negotiate a treaty can be relevant to Article XX review in order to see
whether unilateralism is justified. Moreover, it is not clear whether the
Appellate Body is suggesting a general duty to negotiate or, more narrowly, a
duty to avoid discrimination in negotiations.
Although better disciplines for PPMs can emerge through WTO
adjudication, some of the criteria suggested here are not in GATT Article XX
and should not be read into it. Thus, rather than relying on evolutionary
interpretation, it would be better for the WTO to negotiate new rules so that
all governments could participate in this exercise. Moreover, the opportunities
for lawmaking through interpretation are limited by the content and flow of
the cases. Such negotiations could bring to bear other solutions-for example,
capacity building for environmental management-that would require action
outside the WTO. Achieving this result need not require any change in Article
XX itself. Rather, governments could negotiate an Understanding on Article
XX analogous to the seven GATT Understandings negotiated during the
Uruguay Round.
B. Improving WTO Management of PPMs
To improve management of PPMs, the following steps should be taken.
First, the WTO should promote greater transparency of PPMs. This might be
done through the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (or through another WTO
subsidiary body) with input from relevant international organizations."'2 A
WTO review of a particular PPM-written outside the context of dispute
settlement-might give some impetus to self-examination by the demandeur
government. One should not assume that the only way to get a government's
attention is to convict it of a WTO violation.
Second, a new trade and environment conflict is a signal of inadequate
international environmental cooperation, and that signal should be transmitted
into a recommendation by the WTO to appropriate multilateral environmental
institutions. The Tuna-Dolphin I panel said that the negotiation of
international cooperative arrangements for dolphin protection "would seem to
be desirable in view of the fact that dolphins roam the waters of many states
and the high seas." '283 The Shrimp-Turtle panel said that "the best way for the
parties to this dispute to contribute effectively to the protection of sea turtles
in a manner consistent with WTO objectives, including sustainable
development, would be to reach cooperative agreements on integrated
conservation strategies."2 The Appellate Body in the Shrimp-Turtle case said
that governments should act together "bilaterally, plurilaterally and
multilaterally, either within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect
REV. 511, 593 (2000).
282. See Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, Annex 3, LEGAL
TEXTS, supra note 3, at 380.
283. Tuna Dolphin I Report, supra note 129, 5.28.
284. Shrimp-Turtle Panel Report, supra note 199, 9.1 (citation omitted).
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endangered species or to otherwise protect the environment." '285 But neither the
GATT nor the WTO acted on these observations by communicating a
recommendation to a sister international agency.
Third, the WTO should make it easier for developing countries to
comply with PPMs. The WTO might begin by holding hearings to investigate
the costs of controversial PPMs. The hearings could bring to light less
expensive ways to achieve the intended environmental purpose. At such
hearings, the government using the PPM might be asked what financial or
technological assistance it is making available to the adversely affected
countries. The WTO treaty contains some imprecise obligations regarding
assistance to developing countries that could serve as a basis for such an
examination. For example, the TBT Agreement directs governments to "take
account of the special development, financial and trade needs" of developing
countries with a view toward ensuring that regulations "do not create
unnecessary obstacles to exports from developing country Members. '28" The
TRIPS Agreement directs industrial countries to "provide incentives to
enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and
encouraging technology transfer" to less developed countries.287 These
provisions may be too vague to be enforced through dispute settlement, but
they are specific enough for governments to inquire about implementation.
Fourth, the WTO needs to clarify that its disciplines do not prohibit
process-related mandatory labeling.288 PPM labeling offers a potential avenue
to avoid trade restrictions by leaving the choice to consumers. 89 This is a
market friendly response, and truthful labels should not be discouraged by the
WTO.290
Finally, although the above steps would help, new trade and
environment disputes are inevitable. When they occur, the WTO Director-
General should be more active in offering mediation and conciliation
services.29' In some cases, like Shrimp-Turtle, both sides were partly right and
285. Appellate Body Shrimp-Turtle Report, supra note 15, at 185.
286. TBT Agreement, supra note 12, art. 12.3.
287. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, art. 66.2.
288. The only trade case to address labeling was Tuna Dolphin I, which considered the U.S.
criteria for access to a "dolphin-safe" label. The panel found that since tuna could be sold in the United
States with or without the label, the U.S. law did not violate GATT Article I. Tuna-Dolphin I Report,
supra note 129, 1 5.41-44. The panel's decision offers no guidance as to whether a law requiring that
all tuna be labeled as to its dolphin safety or non-safety would violate WTO rules.
289. Of course, a consumer may want to free ride by buying the less expensive product
without the label. So a label alone may not be an optimal response to economic externalities. Chang,
supra note 17, at 2177; Howse & Regan, supra note 44, at 273.
290. See ESTY, supra note 1, at 283 (indicating with matrix when labeling is the appropriate
instrument); Doaa Abdel Motaal, The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, The Committee on
Trade and Environment, and Eco-Labelling, in TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE MILLENNIUM, supra
note 1, at 223; Geert van Calster, The EU Trade, Environment and Unilateralism: Passing the Buck, 5
EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 2-25 (2000) (discussing WTO law on labeling). Labeling is also controversial
on issues beyond the environment. See, e.g., Janet Hilowitz, Social Labelling to Combat Child Labour:
Some Considerations, 136 INT'L LAB. REv. 215 (1997); Daniel Pruzin, Developing Countries Hit Out at
Belgian "'Labor Label" at WTO, BNA DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Apr. 2, 2001, at A-6.
291. See DSU, supra note 75, art. 5.6; Yuji Iwasawa, Settlement of Disputes Concerning the
WTO Agreement: Various Means Other Than Panel Procedures, in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON
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partly wrong. That dispute should have been settled (or prevented) with the
United States giving help to the complaining countries to improve shrimping
practices. Another idea-suggested by Gabrielle Marceau-is for the WTO to
establish an Environmental Advisory Body. This Body would seek a solution
to trade and environment conflicts short of formal dispute settlement.2  The
composition of such a Body could include experts from industry and non-
governmental organizations.
V. .CONCLUSION
As highlighted in the October 2001 Appellate Body decision in Shrimp-
Turtle, an environmental PPM is not illegal under WTO rules. Whenever it
violates GATT Articles I, III, or XI, a PPM will be reviewed under GATT
Article XX(b) or (g) and the chapeau to the Article. With respect to the
chapeau, the Appellate Body has explained that the line of legality "moves as
the kind and the shape of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making
up specific cases differ." '293 Thus, the WTO legality of a PPM will depend both
on its environmental rationale and on its implementation.
By debunking the myth that PPMs are illegal and by exploring why they
are used, this Article develops a new approach to the PPM problem that views
PPMs as a symptom of govemance dysfunction. To remedy this dysfunction,
policymakers should address the root causes of conflict. Sometimes
governments use PPMs because that is the only way to respond to a global or
transborder environmental harm occurring in another country. In those
situations, the right role for the WTO may be to stand aside.294 Sometimes
governments use PPMs to counter a loss of competitiveness arising out of
domestic regulation. In those situations, the right role for the WTO may be to
seek withdrawal of the PPM. Outside the WTO, there will be a need for
international environmental institutions to step in with technical assistance
and other efforts to spur environmental cooperation. With proper oversight by
the WTO, PPMs may help solve the problems that elicit their use by
catalyzing governments to improve environmental policy.
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